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It was the 16th of January 2015, my master’s studies at Maastricht University were in full swing 
and I had just applied for a semester abroad in India, when I received an email that turned out 
to shape my life for the years to come. My professor, Alexander Brüggen, asked if I were 
interested in a PhD position. I learnt that this was not just any request for a conventional PhD 
position, but it was an offer to participate in a collaborative research initiative between 
Maastricht University and one of the leading automotive companies in the world. Anyone in 
his clear mind that considered a PhD would have gone above and beyond for an opportunity 
like this.  
Looking back today, I can confess that at the time I was not considering a PhD, I wanted to 
kickstart my professional career and challenge myself in the business world. Luckily, my 
dearest advisors and supporters, my parents Hedwig & Jürgen, asked why I wouldn’t consider 
this opportunity. In the end, it turned out to be one of the best decisions of my personal 
development to revisit the idea of doing a PhD and look at my professor’s request again more 
closely. 
Now, four years after beginning my PhD in January 2016, it is time for me to just be grateful. 
Alex, you have not only been my Supervisor, you have been a mentor, a friend and, most of all, 
you have been available 24/7 via Whatsapp for any related or unrelated queries. I’m deeply 
thankful for your support. You have empowered me to identify and pursue my own research 
interests. Working with you drove me to tackle problems pragmatically from different 
perspectives and always focus on the managerial implications. Research without practical 
relevance is something we don’t do. Your words still resonate in my head today and have had 
a much broader effect on me than it may seem at first. To me your words meant, don’t do 
something, if it doesn’t create value or impact. Thank you, Alex. 
 
My Co-Supervisor, Edward Huizenga, has supported me strongly through my PhD journey as 
well. With his extensive practical experience as a partner at Benthurst & Co., a leading Dutch 
strategy consultancy, coupled with academic perspective in his role as Professor of Strategy, 
Innovation and Change, he would always provide valuable feedback to my academic work. For 
me, his understanding of new business development gave me the chance to challenge academic 
theoretical fundament with anecdotal evidence from his practical experience. I am convinced 
that Edward consistently ensured the applicability of my research in practice. 
Although I happened to be an external PhD candidate, I tried to tap into the vast experience and 
in-depth knowledge of my colleagues. In particular, I’d like to thank Christoph & Frank for 
supporting me in the process of laying the groundwork for articles. Your feedback has always 
been to the point and straightforward; something I value to this day. I also want to thank Katlijn 
for keeping me connected to the home base and providing me with reasons to visit Maastricht 
University more often. I’m always happy to be there, so hopefully those invitations keep 
coming.  
The benefit of being an external PhD candidate is that you have more colleagues. For me, those 
were the colleagues I worked with most of the time. First, I’d like to thank my supervisor, Lars, 
who gave me the opportunity to pursue my PhD in the first place. Not only did I receive the 
opportunity, but I also found an environment that allowed me to strive and excel both in my 
professional and academic work. To learn about intrapreneurship and gain insights about its 
success drivers, I could have not created my work without the invaluable support of Martin and 
Tobi. You guys have not only been great colleagues and supporters of my research, but also 
extremely pleasant to be around. Thank you for that. Last, but certainly not least, I want to 
thank my dear colleague and friend Gregor. Your happiness, ambition and wit have always 
been an inspiration to me. Together we have had a blast in the office and it was you, who made 
my workday a little less corporate. You know what I mean with that. Thank you! 
 
I’m very excited about the following paragraphs. Why? Because I can dedicate a few lines of 
my dissertation to the people who mean the world to me. Mum & dad, you’re simply the best. 
I would not be the curious and ambitious mind that I am today, if it weren’t for you. The same 
gratitude goes out to my sister, Henrike, if there is one person I can always count on and share 
my thoughts with, it’s you. Thank you for being the best sibling anyone could ever ask for. 
To my friends, who have accompanied me along the way to my PhD and beyond, I am deeply 
thankful for our relationships. Philip, let it be city trips, let it be a podcast, let it be long nights 
with drinks, parties and great conversations, we’ve been through it all. I hope that our ways 
won’t part and that we’ll have many more chapters to write together. Flo, when you stepped 
into my life, it changed for the better. Your signature traits are positivity, candidness and charm, 
none of which I want to miss in my life going forward. I am certain, we will have an incredible 
time ahead of us. Schmücki, what can I say? You’re a smart, good-hearted guy from head to 
toe with whom I’ve had endless conversations about academic research and statistics. I thank 
for that and I know that my refusal to respond to +5min voice messages will only bring us closer 
together. Max, we have started our journey together during our master’s degree in Maastricht. 
We share memorable experiences such as a reckless road trip in India or an ambulance ride to 
a hospital in Düsseldorf. I know, we can always count on each other – thank you. Lars, you’ve 
inspired me with your diligence and persistence for as long as I can remember. Until this day, 
I happily recall the times of flat sharing and early morning workouts. 
All in all, it’s been a wild ride and I can confidently say that I’ve grown. I hope that with my 
academic research I can contribute to the discussion about corporate innovation and 
intrapreneurship, while also providing some inspiration for aspiring researchers like I was 
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For corporations, it is a challenge to innovate. Large organizations are inherently hamstrung by 
their existing organizational and decision-making processes. These processes have been 
optimized over decades to deliver and support core business, while minimizing possibility of 
any deviation, good or bad. This process paralysis manifests itself in two ways, (1) managers 
are actively discouraged to take risks and (2) innovative ideas are constrained as these would 
be considered a deviation from existing process structures (Don Lovallo et al., 2020). While 
top managers, in theory, should be taking risky decisions to create value for stakeholders, the 
opposite holds true in practice. Top management in large organizations is reluctant to propose 
and advocate risky projects. Rather than pursuing new business opportunities, managers prefer 
marginal improvements to the core business. Although this pattern in corporate behavior is far 
from new (Hammond, 1967), in dynamical changing market environments with new business 
evolving each and every day across the globe, it is more relevant than ever (Lovallo et al., 
2020). To overcome this fallacy, two phenomena can be observed in the corporate world today 
that are subject to this dissertation. 
First, top managers receive immense amounts of information that is supposed to enable 
decision-making, especially in the allocation of funds to innovation projects. Due to decreasing 
costs to acquire information, more information is available to managers with the intention to 
empower and improve decision-making. However, more information may not necessarily the 
answer to top managers’ reluctance to allocate funds to risky projects. More information means 
that not all information provided is relevant to decision-makers, because managers need to 
navigate through the data and identify diagnostic from non-diagnostic information. It could 
therefore be the case that decisions could be negatively impacted rather than improved, which 
is why in this dissertation I examine whether there are limits of providing information to 
decision-makers in order to facilitate capital budgeting for risky projects. 
 
Second, corporations create so-called innovation labs or intrapreneurship centers in which they 
permit deviations from existing processes in order to fuel to innovative spirit of the 
organization. It is not uncommon to give pretentious names to these organizational units and 
locate them in allegedly innovative cities or environments. While some employees consider 
these units as an opportunity to pursue their entrepreneurial calling, manage an innovation 
project independently and become an intrapreneur, an entrepreneur in an existing organization, 
top managers find themselves to be challenged in a setting like this. The reasons for top 
managers’ struggles are manifold, short-sighted corporate incentive structures deem inadequate 
for innovative undertakings, hierarchies are called into question, technological savviness 
becomes a prerequisite and de-centralized decision-making is considered the norm. Therefore, 
in my dissertation, I combine research from finance & management accounting on capital 
allocation and decision making with the research from innovation management and 
intrapreneurship to understand how these two fields must interplay in order to generate 
company value as well as contributing novel insights to the world of research. 
1.1 Theoretical background 
 
1.1.2  Dilution effect in capital budgeting decisions 
 
Studies in accounting research suggest that traditional financial assessments can be inadequate 
in capital budgeting tasks, particularly under high risk, and should therefore be complemented 
with additional information (Chen 2008; Chow and Van der Stede 2006). According to the 
results of Chen (2008), discounted cash flow (DCF) techniques can be partially substituted by 
nonfinancial information. Some research even state that additional nonfinancial information 
has the same relevance as financial information in capital budgeting. Although I recognize this 
research as well as decision-makers’ desire to be as informed as possible, I hypothesize that 
more information increase stress for decision-makers to maneuver through their own 
information systems (Piercy 2018). The potential of an information overabundance coupled 
 
with the risk of providing non-diagnostic information, meaning information that is irrelevant to 
assess a decision outcome, can cause a dilution effect to occur such that suboptimal capital 
allocations are taken (Troutman and Shanteau 1977; Nisbett et al. 1981; Hackenbrack 1992; 
Shanteau 1992; Glover 1997; Shelton 1999; Hotaling et al. 2015). The dilution effect occurs 
when nondiagnostic information is added to diagnostic information in a decision process, which 
can negatively influence decision outcome. This phenomenon has been studied in a variety of 
decision tasks, yet my research is the first to transfer this concept to risky capital budgeting 
tasks. The reasoning for applying this concept to the area of capital budgeting is attributed to 
the inherent complexity of capital budgeting stemming from (1) various information sources, 
(2) different types of information and (3) uncertainty about the underlying parameters the 
restrict reliable assessment. Understanding the underlying mechanisms of potential dilution 
effects has significant influence on the design of management information systems for risky 
project assessments and the presentation of information to decision-makers in general. 
1.1.3 Top management support in intrapreneurship 
 
Intrapreneurship literature describes intrapreneurial activity as a bottom-up initiative by an 
entrepreneurially-minded individual in an existing organization that attempts to innovate the 
firm outside of the core business (Antoncic & Hisrich, 2001; Hornsby et al. 2003; Dess & 
Lumpkin 2005). Due to its explorative nature and divergence from standard corporate 
processes, intrapreneurship requires support and safeguarding from top management. For this 
reason, top management needs to back intrapreneurial activity on different levels for instance 
(1) goal-setting involvement, (2) resource allocation, (3) project commitment and sponsorship, 
as well as (4) defending initiatives against adverse opinions in the organization.  
Prior empirical research in related fields has indicated that especially resource commitment and 
adequate leadership provide positive influence on new product development (Swink 2000). 
Zirger and Maidique (1990) find that top management attention usually attracts talented 
 
workforce, which could also be an alleviating factor in intrapreneurship, given that top 
managers support the initiative. Similarly, however, top management support may also turn 
into a detrimental force, if controlling of intrapreneurial activities take over (Gersick et al. 1990) 
because intrapreneurs become constrained in their individual pursuit of their project. This effect 
is worsened by commonly near-term oriented incentive schemes by top managers that lay 
emphasis on short-term wins instead of investing in long-term innovation initiatives like 
intrapreneurship. Moreover, a lack of technical expertise among top managers can also have 
negative impact on intrapreneurship, because for breakthrough innovation deep technical or 
industry-overarching competence may be required to understand the customer value of a new 
business idea (Takeuchi & Nonaka 1986; Swink 2000). To be successful in a large organization, 
intrapreneurs also require an environment that allows the pursuit of innovative undertakings by 
deviating from restricted corporate processes. Besides sufficient resources, literature suggests 
that intrapreneurs can benefit from sufficient time to follow their initiatives (Brazeal, 1993; 
Schuler, 1986; Kuratko et al., 1990), decision autonomy (Mintzberg, 1973; Khandwalla, 1973; 
Slevin & Covin, 1990; Covin & Slevin, 1989; Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999), collaboration 
opportunity (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Gapp & Fisher, 2007; Alpkan et al., 2010). These aspects 
can both have positive implications for the success, but also for the innovativeness of the 
project. 
1.4  Research method 
 
To examine my research questions, I pursued a mixed method approach (Denscombe, 2008; 
Yin, 2006), where I performed a laboratory experiment with students from Maastricht 
University, I conducted 10 case based interviews with managers running intrapreneurship 
programs in MNCs across Europe and I ran a survey among 63 intrapreneurs in a large 
manufacturing firm in Germany. To investigate decision behavior of individuals, a laboratory 
environment creates a controlled abstract setting that holds everything constant except for the 
 
manipulations of interest. Further, experiment participants are randomly allocated to different 
treatments. Hence, the experimental method isolates the effects under examination and tests the 
cause-effect-relationship. Although laboratory environments do not mimic a real work setting, 
it allows me control for exogeneous influences, therefore it is ideal to investigate decision-
making behavior as part of my first research question. 
For my second study, I chose to follow a more explorative approach by conducting expert 
interviews to generate an understanding of how intrapreneurship is managed in practice. This 
procedure allowed me to complement the current state of research on the topic and investigate 
the function and duties of top managers in this context more closely. It also helped to shed light 
on the causal direction between TMS and intrapreneurship and supported the development of 
my conceptual model that I used for my subsequent survey analysis. Further, I was able to 
extract what an intrapreneurial environment would look like in a large organization. Based on 
these insights, my survey, which I issued to 119 intrapreneurs within a large European 
corporation, tested my hypotheses concerning the role of top management support and 
intrapreneurial environment in intrapreneurship. The quantitative data enabled an empirical 
analysis to test the hypothesized relationships and thereby providing substantiated evidence for 
my research question. 
1.5  Main findings, contributions and implications 
 
The findings of my dissertation show that to improve capital budgeting in risky innovation 
projects more information is not necessarily better, particularly when non-diagnostic 
information is also provided. I find that more non-diagnostic information actually causes 
suboptimal decision-making, as the overabundance of information creates a dilution effect such 
that funds allocated to risky projects lowers. My results show that this effect is more 
pronounced with an increasing number of non-diagnostic information cues. I also find that 
decision-makers exhibit preferences towards particular types of information cues, such that 
 
nonfinancial information is only preferred in the absence of risk and information load, whereas 
when decision risk is high, preferences lean towards more familiar financial information. These 
findings contribute to a growing stream of literature on management information systems 
(MIS). Despite the trend to measure as many things as possible, my results give reason to 
believe that there are limits to this and under some conditions, too much information can have 
detrimental effects, especially when diagnostic and nondiagnostic information is provided 
jointly. Hence, capital budgeting for risky projects needs MIS that focus on a selected number 
of information cues that bear diagnostic power to the decision outcome. 
Further, my findings indicate that the role of top managers to facilitate intrapreneurial 
innovation projects is relevant to lend organizational backing. I was able to establish the causal 
relationship that TMS is a determinant for intrapreneurship. Based on my interview insights 
and survey analysis, top management support is essential for intrapreneurship to really flourish. 
I reveal that top management support has a positive influence on the success of intrapreneurship 
projects, while it has arguably a negative impact on project innovativeness. For one, top 
managers can move aside organizational obstacles to ensure progress for the project, for the 
other, top management support can also cause interference and a lack of technical knowledge 
may restrain the innovational power of the project. I also find that top managers need to shape 
an entrepreneurial environment that is particularly geared towards networking amongst 
colleagues in the same organization, because this is a key driver for intrapreneurs’ 
innovativeness. Under these conditions, top managers can take a contributing role for 
innovative undertakings and empower those who pursue intrapreneurial projects. 
  
 





With large amounts of information available, managers find it increasingly challenging to 
distinguish between diagnostic and nondiagnostic information when making decisions. I 
investigate how decision makers take information into account in capital budgeting decisions 
and what impact nondiagnostic information has on the decision outcome, hence, whether 
nondiagnostic information leads to a dilution effect. I also consider whether risk and 
information load in capital budgeting decisions is associated with a focus on financial or 
nonfinancial nondiagnostic information. In an experiment I manipulate the level of risk of a 
decision context and the amount of nondiagnostic information provided. I find evidence that 
the provision of nondiagnostic information cues stimulates a dilution effect coupled with lower 
investments. I observe this effect to become more pronounced with an increasing number of 
nondiagnostic information cues. My results also indicate that decision makers in a high-risk 
scenario commit to lower investments, which in general remains the case when more 
nondiagnostic information cues are provided. I also find that decision makers only prefer 
nonfinancial information in the absence of risk and cognitive load, whereas in high-risk 
decision contexts decision makers use more familiar financial information cues when exposed 
to more nondiagnostic information cues. My findings have implications for the design of 
management information systems. Despite the trend to measure as many things as possible to 
support capital budgeting decisions, I show that the benefits of increasing the amount of 
information have limits, particularly when diagnostic and nondiagnostic cues are presented 





2.1  Introduction 
 
Managers receive large amounts of information every day that is supposed to support decision 
making. As such, part of their job is to distinguish between diagnostic and nondiagnostic 
information when making strategic decisions. Diagnostic information is information that is at 
least remotely predictive of a certain outcome. With the rise of information systems and the 
decreasing costs of obtaining information, more information is available to managers, but it is 
not necessarily relevant to the decisions they need to make and thus nondiagnostic (Brown-
Liburd et al. 2015; McKinsey Global Institute 2017). In this study, I investigate how decision 
makers take information into account in capital budgeting decisions and what impact 
nondiagnostic information has on the decision outcome. This research is particularly important 
from an accounting perspective because the provision of information is a key purpose of 
management information systems (MIS). Nondiagnostic information should have no effect on 
decisions, and only diagnostic information should drive decision processes. However, prior 
research (Troutman and Shanteau 1977; Hackenbrack 1992; Shanteau 1992; Glover 1997; 
Shelton 1999; Hotaling et al. 2015) has demonstrated that managers are influenced by 
nondiagnostic information and are susceptible to a dilution effect (Nisbett et al. 1981; Hoffman 
and Patton 1997). This effect occurs when nondiagnostic information added to diagnostic 
information changes a decision, which can negatively influence outcomes. While dilutive 
effects of nondiagnostic information have been studied in various decision scenarios, such as 
psychological judgments (Gaeth and Shanteau 1984), perceptual decision making (Hotaling et 
al. 2015), auditing (Glover 1997; Shelton 1999), consumer decisions (Meyvis and Janiszewski 
2002), and uncertainty judgments in general (Tversky and Kahneman 1973), these effects have 
scarcely been investigated in the context of capital budgeting decisions.  
For many firms, capital budgeting decisions are a complex process because (1) information 
stems from a variety of sources, (2) different types of information need to be processed, and (3) 
 
uncertainty about underlying parameters hinders reliable assessments (Chow and Van der Stede 
2006; Chen 2008). The finance literature generally advocates to rely on net present value (NPV) 
analysis in capital budgeting decisions as an aggregate of all decision-relevant information 
(Myers 1984; Ross 1995; Banker et al. 2004), yet it is evident that in practice decision makers 
consider other information as well (Cardinaels and van Veen-Dirks 2010; Turner and Coote 
2018). In my study, I concur that NPV is the deterministic decision measure and that any other 
information is either (1) redundant because it is already contained in the NPV analysis, or (2) 
uncorrelated with the desired outcome; hence, I refer to it as nondiagnostic information. Based 
on arguments from prior literature (Anderson 1971), I expect that when provided together with 
diagnostic information (e.g., NPV) in a capital budgeting decision task, nondiagnostic 
information creates a dilution effect that causes decision makers to deviate from an NPV-only 
assessment. Likewise, I anticipate the more nondiagnostic information decision makers receive, 
the stronger the dilution effect will be. An interesting additional question relates to the type of 
nondiagnostic information (i.e., whether it is nonfinancial or financial) and decision makers’ 
preference to favor one over the other in a capital budgeting decision. Based on evidence from 
prior research on high risk decision contexts, i.e. venture capital or information system 
investments, decision makers’ familiarity with particular information cues or metrics drives 
decision confidence (Tam 1992; Ahmed 2013). Similarly, I presume that in high-risk decision 
scenarios with exposure to nondiagnostic information, decision makers revert to familiar 
information cues when confronted with growing amounts of nondiagnostic information. 
Conversely, I only expect decision makers to experiment with unfamiliar, nonfinancial 
information in their decision processes when the decision context exhibits low risk while only 
a limited amount of nondiagnostic information cues is provided. Insights from this examination 
provide novel implications for MIS design in capital budgeting regimes. 
 
To test my predictions, I ran an experiment with 120 participants conducting 6 consecutive 
capital budgeting decisions in which I randomly assigned participants to either a high- or low-
risk scenario. I manipulated the amount of nondiagnostic information cues available in both 
treatments. I kept the composition of nondiagnostic information cues evenly distributed 
between financial and nonfinancial cues across all treatments with nondiagnostic information 
provided. Results of my experiment support the idea that decision makers use nondiagnostic 
information in capital budgeting decisions. I find evidence that the provision of nondiagnostic 
information cues stimulates a dilution effect in capital budgeting decisions coupled with lower 
investments. In fact, I observe this effect to become more pronounced with an increasing 
number of nondiagnostic information cues. Further, my analysis indicates that analogous to 
prior research decision makers in a high-risk scenario commit to lower investments, which in 
general remains the case when more nondiagnostic information cues are provided. With a 
growing number of nondiagnostic information cues provided, decision makers tend to utilize 
more information cues, while evidence of my experiment also shows that a larger share of 
nonfinancial information cues is used in the absence of risk and cognitive load. 
Although an extensive body of literature centers on the importance of relevant information in a 
capital budgeting decision (Larcker 1981; Sharda et al. 1988; Swain and Haka 2000), 
remarkably little is known about the effect of nondiagnostic information on a capital budgeting 
decision. My study contributes to the growing stream of literature on the dilution effect. I 
underline the importance of information selection in capital budgeting decision tasks, and my 
findings provide novel implications for MIS design. Despite the trend to measure as many 
things as possible to enhance the quality of decisions and to facilitate capital budgeting 
decisions, I show that the benefits of increasing the amount of information have limits, 
particularly when diagnostic and nondiagnostic cues are presented jointly in capital budgeting 
 
decisions. Furthermore, I explore decision scenarios that may produce outcomes beyond those 
expected to fuel future research efforts. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, I provide a comprehensive literature 
review and hypotheses development. Then, I describe the experimental method before the 
results are presented. Lastly, I discuss my findings and conclude. 
2.2  Theory and hypothesis development 
 
Recent studies in accounting suggest that traditional financial assessment tools can be 
inadequate and should be augmented with additional information. Chow and Van der Stede 
(2006) surveyed 128 manufacturing firms and concluded that a combination of financial, 
nonfinancial, and subjective measures would improve management decisions. Research by 
Chen (2008) focuses on capital budgeting and shows that traditional discounted cash flow 
(DCF) techniques can be partially substituted by nonfinancial information. Related 
experimental evidence from Turner and Coote (2018) reports that nonfinancial information has 
relevance similar to that of financial information for decision makers in capital budgeting 
regimes. Although I recognize this research, it appears as if managers do not receive expedient 
support from all this extra information; instead, they find themselves under stress, confronted 
with the task of maneuvering their own information systems (Piercy 2018). While the adverse 
effects of a growing information load are well recognized, the influence of potential 
overabundance of nondiagnostic information is scarcely understood, which is why I investigate 
the dilutive effect of such information in capital budgeting decisions (Ackoff 1967; Eppler and 
Mengis 2004). 
2.2.1  The dilution effect in capital budgeting decisions 
 
The literature proposes different reasons for why managers integrate nondiagnostic information 
into decision-making processes. For a capital budgeting decision, or in fact for any significant 
decision that affects prospective company performance, managers expect to be extensively 
 
informed. This expectation is often accompanied by risk as well as a manager’s fear of making 
wrong decisions (Tversky and Kahneman 1973; Jackall 1988). In turn, decision makers demand 
additional information to gain a better understanding of the task at hand. Additional 
information, however, can contain low-validity or nondiagnostic information cues (Ackoff 
1967; Brown-Liburd et al. 2015). 
Kahneman and Tversky (1973), for example, show that the mere presence of information 
induces managers to take nondiagnostic cues into account for decision-making purposes. 
Studies by Shanteau (1992) and Gorla et al. (2010) arrive at the same conclusion. One problem 
for managers confronted with various pieces of information is distinguishing what information 
is diagnostic and what is nondiagnostic. This discernment becomes particularly difficult in 
capital budgeting decisions, as the capital budgeting literature suggests that various types of 
information, such as financial, nonfinancial, and subjective criteria, as well as the various 
sources of information, could potentially be relevant for decision makers (Chow and Van der 
Stede 2006; Chen 2008; Turner and Coote 2018). 
Prior literature has established different reasons why a dilution effect occurs. Studies by 
Doherty and other researchers identify a so-called “pseudodiagnosticity effect,” whereby 
subjects even prefer nondiagnostic cues over diagnostic ones when both are available (Doherty, 
Mynatt, et al. 1979; Doherty, Schiavo, et al. 1981). Individuals thus seem to have a tendency to 
ignore base rate data and to seek confirmatory evidence. This phenomenon is quite common in 
practice: managers who are interested in pursuing a pet project search primarily for data that 
supports their claim that the project is worthwhile for the company to convince their superior. 
The most common explanation in the social judgment literature of the dilution effect relies on 
the similarity heuristic (Sprinkle 2003; Fein and Hilton 1992; Tetlock and Boettger 1989; 
Nisbett et al. 1981). The similarity heuristic is an approach by which decision makers form their 
choices based on the perceived similarity between a mental model that produces a certain 
 
outcome and the information provided. Diagnostic information is proposed to represent the 
desired outcome, while nondiagnostic information does not. Hence, more nondiagnostic 
information reduces the representativeness of the desired outcome and dilutes the decision 
maker’s judgment. Although this model is suitable for probability judgments in social 
experiments, as such, it disregards decision makers’ general risk-taking propensity and 
subjective assessments of information relevance, which are both crucial factors in capital 
budgeting decisions (Gigerenzer and Gassmaier 2011).  
In general, more information in decision tasks raises concerns about the dilution effect because 
chances to collect nondiagnostic information increase (Nisbett et al. 1981). To prepare major 
capital budgeting decisions, the gathering and processing of different types of information from 
a variety of sources is required for a solid decision-making basis. Research by Chewning and 
Harrell (1990) finds that in financial distress decisions, more information cues lead to more cue 
utilization, which in turn produces lower decision quality. Sprinkle’s (2003) analysis of 
experimental research in managerial accounting shows that decision makers integrate 
potentially dilutive (e.g., nondiagnostic) information into their decision processes in an effort 
to consider all the information provided for a decision task. This phenomenon could also induce 
capital budgeting decision makers to pay attention to nondiagnostic information when forming 
their judgment. Based on findings by Kahneman and Tversky (1973) as well as Hackenbrack 
(1992), the integration of nondiagnostic information is even more pronounced when such 
information is presented to decision makers as being more salient. Salience is primarily 
determined by the capacity to capture decision makers’ attention. It can be attributed to the 
presentation of a specific piece of information or to the sheer amount of a particular kind of 
information. Therefore, if more nondiagnostic information cues are provided in a decision task, 
some, if not all, of these additional information cues are presumably incorporated into the 
decision-making process. Following the aforementioned arguments, I expect nondiagnostic 
 
information to dilute decision makers’ judgment in capital budgeting decisions such that 
investment amounts decrease, and even more so, when the amount of nondiagnostic 
information increases. Hence, I formulate the following two hypotheses: 
H1a: The provision of nondiagnostic information creates a dilution effect. 
H1b: The more nondiagnostic information provided, the stronger the dilution effect in capital 
budgeting decisions. 
2.2.2 The use of nondiagnostic information types in capital budgeting decisions 
 
While effects of risk and cognitive load on investment behavior have been comprehensively 
studied (Lam et al., 2011; Hoffmann et al., 2013; Agnew and Szykman, 2005) and can also be 
observed in my research, the subsequent question of what type of nondiagnostic information 
(i.e., financial versus nonfinancial information) investors consider in their capital budgeting 
decision process in light of high risk and cognitive load, and why, adds novelty.  
Prior studies have investigated how capital budgeting tasks are facilitated in organizations using 
financial information (Mao 1970; Burns and Walker 1997; Verbeeten 2006; Chen 2008). A 
common method to evaluate the attractiveness of investment options involves financial 
analysis, namely DCF techniques, that consider the value of a project as the discounted sum of 
future cash flows (e.g., the NPV; Berk and DeMarzo 2007). Although NPV is widely 
recognized as a comprehensive, definitive financial decision measure, NPV has some 
limitations due to an often limited accuracy of input variables (Sundem 1975; Myers 1984; 
Ross 1995; Verbeeten 2006; Chen 2008). Market environments rattled by political instability 
and fluctuating interest and exchange rates pose a particular challenge because qualitative risks 
need to be translated into adjusted discount rates for adequate decision making (Chittenden and 
Derregia 2015). For unstructured projects, such as new product developments, assessing cash 
flow timing reliably can also be difficult (Gorry and Morton 1989). To assess economic 
viability in risky new product developments, firms have been found to be more likely to 
 
complement traditional DCF methods with strategic, nonfinancial insights (Chen 2008; Hoff 
and Wood 2008). 
In order to overcome the limitations of DCF techniques, many authors in the capital budgeting 
field have proposed the introduction of nonfinancial information in project evaluation processes 
(Hoque and James 2000; Hoque 2005; Verbeeten 2006; Chen 2008). Nonfinancial information 
is data that, contrary to accounting and market measures (the ‘financial ones’) do not refer to 
‘bottom line’ results or stock returns, but rather to internal processes, customers, and 
macroeconomic indicators (Banker et al. 2000; Ittner and Larcker 2003; Chow and Van der 
Stede 2006). The investment planning literature refers to nonfinancial information as “the other 
recommended approach” to use beyond traditional capital budgeting methods (Chen 2008). 
Specifically, the use of nonfinancial information is suggested to those organizations that, for 
different reasons, cannot reliably estimate DCFs. In fact, the complexity in calculating DCF 
constitutes one of the main reasons for why nonfinancial information gained importance in the 
1990s (Burns and Walker 1997; Pike 1996). Low and Siesfeld (1998) find further support for 
the role of nonfinancial information in major investors’ decision making. Specifically, they 
show that when analysts took nonfinancial measures like market share and customer retention 
into account, forecasts were more accurate. Nonfinancial information is considered valuable 
when risk is high; in such situations, financial information is considered of less value because 
of its rather aggregated nature and tendency to be backward looking. 
Although accounting literature provides reasoning for why decision makers are well-advised to 
integrate nonfinancial information into their capital budgeting decision process, findings of 
prior research on individuals’ behavior in risky and cognitively demanding tasks suggest an 
alternative course of action by decision makers. Banker et al. (2004) investigate how decision 
makers trade off financial with nonfinancial performance metrics in a balanced scorecard. The 
results indicate that if an integration nonfinancial performance metrics did not imply a decline 
 
in short term financial gain, only then nonfinancial information was considered by decision 
makers. From a management accounting standpoint, Bhimani and Langfield-Smith (2007) 
discover similar preoccupations by individuals in strategy development and implementation 
tasks. While greater emphasis is placed on financial information in strategy implementation, 
nonfinancial information comes into play in strategy development, where it compliments 
financial information. Both Banker et al. and Bhimani and Langfield-Smith underline decision 
makers’ predominant focus on financial metrics, particularly to ensure short term financial 
performance. 
Psychology researchers Tversky and Kahneman (1973; 1974) provide an additional line of 
reasoning for why decision makers would revert to using financial information in a capital 
budgeting task. The concept of familiarity heuristic conveys that in decision scenarios where 
individuals experience a high cognitive load induced by risk or an overabundance of 
information, they tend to regress to a state of mind where familiar information cues are 
predominantly integrated into the decision process (Whitney et al., 2008; Gerhardt et al., 2013; 
Benjamin et al., 2013). Familiar in this context means that individuals have either been 
acquainted with that type of information or that they have used it previously in a similar task. 
In capital budgeting decision, nonfinancial information is thought of as a novel, complementary 
information type that shall be used in addition to traditional financial information, in that regard, 
nonfinancial information can be considered rather unfamiliar to decision makers in this context. 
It is for that reason, I concur with the general consensus advocated in accounting literature to 
integrate nonfinancial information into capital budgeting decisions, however, I hypothesize to 
only find this to be the case in absence of risk and cognitive load in the decision scenario, 
because otherwise, I expect decision makers to revert to familiar financial information in their 
decision process. Hence, I propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: In capital budgeting decisions, nonfinancial information is used more in the absence of 
risk and cognitive load. 
2.3     Experiment 
 
I ran an experiment with 120 students at a Dutch university enrolled in economics and/or 
international business studies, hence having some theoretical experience with investment 
decisions from their courses. The average age of the participants was 21.2 years, and 62 percent 
were female. All participants had participated in prior experiments and thus had some 
familiarity with laboratory experiments. I conducted the experiment using computer software 
(z-Tree; Fischbacher 2007) and ensured participants’ anonymity by using randomly drawn 
experimental identification (ID) numbers. Participants were compensated based on their 
performance. The experiment lasted about 45 minutes. 
2.3.1  Experimental task and procedure 
 
Participants were randomly allocated to the different experimental treatments (Table 1) and 
received the instructions explaining the capital budgeting decisions they would be facing in the 
experiment. The flow of the experiment can be viewed in Appendix A – Part 1. In my 
experiment, participants assumed the role of corporate managers taking capital budgeting 
decisions. In particular, participants had to decide how much of a fixed budget of 100,000 
Experimental Currency Units (ECU) they wanted to invest in a risky option. Participants were 
asked to freely allocate their budget to a risky option (Investment A) and/or a risk-free 
alternative (Investment B).1 There were six consecutive decisions to be made, that would allow 
us to observe consistent behavior across decision rounds. In my instructions, I provided four 
example decisions and outcomes to illustrate the experimental task. Participants had to pass an 
 
1 Participants had to actively allocate an investment amount to Investment A, and the remaining budget was 
automatically allocated to the risk-free alternative. Participants were fully aware of this allocation scheme. 
 
understanding quiz on the provided information and the compensation system of their task 







I manipulated two different variables. One variable is the level of risk inherent in the risky 
project presented to the participants. I manipulate risk by different levels of variance in the 
payoff outcomes of the risky project. While the variance of payoff outcomes is extremely high 
for one half of the treatments, it is significantly lower for the other half (see Table 3). The other 
TABLE 1 
Experimental treatment groups 
  Low Risk High Risk 
0 information cues Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
6 information cues Treatment 3 Treatment 4 
12 information cues Treatment 5 Treatment 6 
   
 
    
TABLE 2 
Sequence of Experimental Procedures 
1. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of six treatments. 
2. Participants received instructions on the experiment, explanation on the experimental 
currency, and examples of the upcoming task. 
3. Participants had to complete a quiz on the given information and compensation 
system of the upcoming task before continuing. 
4. Each participant was presented an investment opportunity consisting of the risky 
investment project (Investment A) and the risk-free alternative (Investment B) 
5. Each participant was asked to analyze the investment opportunity and allocate his or 
her provided investment budget to Investment A and Investment B. 
6. For treatments 3–6, participants needed to indicate which of the given information 
cues had been used for their capital budgeting decision. 
7. Each participant was presented the next investment opportunity. 
8. At the end of six rounds, all participants were informed about their performance-based 
compensation. 
9. Each participant answered a post-experiment questionnaire (demographics, 




variable I manipulated is the amount of nondiagnostic information provided to the participant 
for the evaluation of the risky project, ranging from zero to six to twelve nondiagnostic 
information cues.2 I selected the information cues based on relevant literature from the capital 
budgeting domain (Hoque and James 2000; Hoque 2005; Larcker 1981). Both settings included 
an even share of financial and nonfinancial information cues. The information cues assumed 
binary values that would either indicate favorable or unfavorable conditions for Investment A. 
Moreover, all participants received the expected NPV of Investment A as well as the lower and 
upper bound of possible outcomes. The expected NPVs and outcome ranges varied 
incrementally across the decision rounds, ensuring homogeneous observations with respect to 
these measures. While the upper and lower bound of possible outcomes had a substantially 
wider range in the high-risk treatments, the expected NPV remained the same in each decision 
round for all treatments to ensure comparability between treatments (Table 3).  
 
2 All participants were aware that this information had no diagnostic value for the outcome of Investment A. 
 
 
All participants were aware that Investment A could only assume the lower or higher bound of 
the possible outcome ranges with equal probability. In all decision rounds, Investment B had 
the same NPV as Investment A in order to avoid arbitrage. Further, to ensure participants’ 
understanding of the information cues, their respective values I issued an overview including 
explanations (Table 4).  
              
TABLE 3 
High Risk 
      
Proposal of the risky company investment project: 
“You are presented a company investment project for an entirely new product development 
that is to be introduced in a highly volatile market in which your company has little 
operational experience." 














Lower Bound Outcome 5,000 1,000 2,000 0 6,000 7,000 
Upper Bound Outcome 193,000 201,000 198,000 204,000 190,000 187,000 
Expected Net Present 
Value 99,000 101,000 100,000 102,000 98,000 97,000 
Range 188,000 200,000 196,000 204,000 184,000 180,000 
       
Low Risk 
      
Proposal of the risky company investment project: 
“You are presented a company investment project for an incremental product extension 
that is to be introduced in a very stable market in which your company has extensive 
operational experience.” 














Lower Bound Outcome 48,000 44,000 45,000 43,000 49,000 50,000 
Upper Bound Outcome 150,000 158,000 155,000 161,000 147,000 144,000 
Expected Net Present 
Value 99,000 101,000 100,000 102,000 98,000 97,000 
Range 102,000 114,000 110,000 118,000 98,000 94,000 
              





I had participants conduct example decisions as well as an understanding questionnaire that 
clearly indicated that only the upper and lower bounds of possible outcomes are diagnostic and 
decision relevant for the risky option (Investment A). Lastly, after each capital budgeting 
    
TABLE 4     




Net cash flowa A project’s net cash flow is the sum of 
cash inflows subtracted by the sum of 
cash outflows. 
Low High 
Timing of cash flowa The timing of cash flow indicates 
whether initial cash outflows are 
recuperated by cash inflows at an early 
stage or at a later stage of the project 
duration. 
Late Early 
Interest ratea Interest rates express the cost of 
borrowing money. 
High Low 
Project durationb Project duration expresses the time 
horizon of a project. 
Long Short 
Product salesb Product sales indicate the projected 
number of product sales in the given 
project. 
Low High 
Product costsb Product costs indicate the expected direct 
costs per product produced in the given 
project. 
High Low 
Product test resultsa Product test results comprise how 
satisfied customers were with their first 
experience with the new product and if 
customers exhibited willingness to pay 
for the new product. 
Weak Strong 
Inflation rate in the 
target marketb 
Inflation rate shows the rate at which 
consumer prices are increasing and, 
consequently, the purchasing power of 
consumers is falling. 
High Low 
Projected GDP 
growth rate in the 
target marketa 
The projected GDP growth rate indicates 
the pace at which an economy is expected 
to grow in the near future. 
Low High 
Projected industry 
growth rate in the 
target marketa 
The projected industry growth rate 
indicates the rate at which sales of an 




in the target marketb 
The unemployment rate expresses the 
share of the labor force that is jobless in 
percentage terms. 
High Low 
Industry positionb Industry position indicates how the 




decision in the experiment, the participants in treatments with additional information cues were 
asked to indicate which cues they utilized for their decision. Upon completion of the 
questionnaire Appendix A – Part 2, the next decision round was automatically initiated. 
2.3.3  Compensation 
 
Participants were paid based on their investment outcome of one randomly selected decision 
period. The compensation was computed as follows:  
Budget allocation in percent to Investment A × outcome of Investment A + 
(1 − budget allocation in percent to Investment A) × outcome of Investment B 
For participants assigned to the high-risk treatments, the range of possible outcomes for 
Investment A spanned from a minimum of 0 ECU to a maximum of 204,000 ECU. As the 
outcome of Investment A was randomly determined and could only assume either the lower or 
upper bound, Investment A had extremely high variance of returns. Unlike the high-risk 
treatments, the low-risk treatments faced a range of possible outcomes for Investment A, from 
a minimum of 43,000 ECU to a maximum of 161,000 ECU. Hence, Investment A in low-risk 
treatments was still risky, but with lower variance. The risk-free alternative, Investment B, 
exhibited the same NPV as Investment A. Strictly speaking, a rational investor would be 
indifferent in the budget allocation regarding the two investments. On average, the participants 
received €10.1 for their participation.  
2.4  Results 
 
2.4.1  Dependent variables and descriptive statistics 
 
To test my hypotheses, I employ decision makers’ investments as the first dependent variable 
in my statistical models. Specifically, I track the absolute amount of EC that decision makers 
allocate to Investment A, the risky investment option. By definition, the variable ranges from 0 
to 100,000, where for 0 no budget is allocated to Investment A and for 100,000 all disposable 
budget is allocated to Investment A. I observe the individual investment choices of each 
 
participant across all six decision rounds. Table 5 presents descriptive statistics of the dependent 
variable for six experimental treatments. The means of the investment amounts indicate that 
high risk generates lower investments in Investment A. Moreover, I can show that an increasing 
number of nondiagnostic information cues decreases decision makers’ investments.  
 
The second dependent variable of interest is the share of nonfinancial information used by 
decision makers. I observed how many nondiagnostic information cues were utilized to evaluate 
Investment A in the decision task. By definition, the variable ranges between 0 and 1, depending 
on whether no financial information, only financial information or a combination of financial 
and nonfinancial information had been used by decision makers. Table 6 contains descriptive 
statistics of the total number of used information cues as well as the share of nonfinancial 
information used across treatment groups 3-6. I can observe that the number of cues used 
increases with an increasing number of nondiagnostic information available. A t-test analysis 
reveals that this difference is statistically significant (t(239)=-25.21, p=0.01). 
 
                  
TABLE 5 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable Means 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
  Low Uncertainty  High Uncertainty 





46366 41606 29767  39271 30967 29067 
 
(24449.0) (28228.8) (26434.8)  (30016.9) (24055.2) (27262.8) 
N 
 
20 20 20 
 
20 20 20 
  
                  
         
Amount invested in Investment A describes the exact amount of experimental currency that has been allocated by participants 




2.4.2  Hypotheses tests 
 
To test the effect of risk and nondiagnostic information on capital budgeting behavior, I test the 
following model: 
Amount invested in Investment A = α0 + α1 6 Information Cues + α2 12 Information Cues + 
α3 Level of Risk +  
where α0 is the intercept and mean amount of EC invested in Investment A, given that all 
predictor variables are set to zero. 6 Information Cues and 12 Information Cues measure the 
amount of nondiagnostic information provided to decision makers. The variable α3 is the 
coefficient of a dummy variable that takes a value of 0 if participants were assigned to the low-
risk treatments, and a value of 1 if participants were assigned to one of the high-risk treatments. 
 
              
TABLE 6 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable Means 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
  Low Risk  High Risk 
Variables  6 Cues 12 Cues  6 Cues 12 Cues 
Total number of 
information cues used 
 
1.71 3.15  1.71 3.24 
 
(1.09) (1.88)  (1.11) (2.10) 
Share of nonfinancial 
information cues used 
 
0.59 0.40  0.45 0.49 
 







              
       
Total number of information cues used describes the exact amount of non-diagnostic information cues 
that have been used by participants in our experiment in each decision round 
Share of nonfinancial information cues used describes the ratio of nonfinancial information cues used 
by participants in our experiment compared to the total number of nondiagnostic information cues used 




To test Model 1, I included all participants’ capital budgeting choices from all six decision 
rounds clustered by experimental ID number. Results are shown in Table 7. The results 
demonstrate that the coefficient of 6 Information Cues is negative and significant (α1 = -6532, 
p-value < 0.10). A provision of six nondiagnostic information cues in capital budgeting 
decisions is indeed associated with lower investments. For 12 Information Cues, my analysis 
shows a similar, statistically significant outcome (α2 = -13402, p-value < 0.01). From these 
results, I can conclude that a provision of nondiagnostic information creates a dilution effect 
that generally reduces decision makers’ investments, which supports hypothesis 1a. To 
determine whether the coefficients of the two variables are substantially different from one 
          
TABLE 7 
OLS Regression Models 
  
Dependent Variable:  
Amount invested in Investment A 
Explanatory Variables Model 1 Model 2 
6 Information Cues -6532 * -4760   
12 Information Cues -13402 *** -16599 *** 
Level of Risk -6145 * -7095   
Level of Risk * 6 Information Cues     -3544   
Level of Risk * 12 Information Cues     6395   
Constant 45890 *** 46366 *** 
Clustered Experimental ID Experimental ID 
Number of Observations (N) 720 720 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0516 0.0572 
*, **, *** significant at the .10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. 
     
6 Information Cues is a binary variable that describes the number of nondiagnostic information cues provided 
to participants in our experiment in each decision round that could be used for decision making purposes 
12 Information Cues is a binary variable that describes the the number of nondiagnostic information cues 
provided to participants in our experiment in each decision round that could be used for decision making 
purposes 
Level of Risk is a binary variable that describes whether the participant in our experiment has been exposed to a 
low risk decision context or a high risk decision context 
 
 
another, I conducted an F-test. I find that the coefficients are in fact statistically different from 
one another, with a probability of 92.46%. Therefore, I can deduce that more nondiagnostic 
information amplifies the dilution effect such that decision makers invest less. This finding also 
supports my hypothesis 1b. Using the same model, the coefficient of Level of Risk is negative 
and significant (α3 = -6145, p-value < 0.10). Hence, risk in capital budgeting decisions is indeed 
associated with a lower investment (10,639 ECU lower) than in a decision scenario with low 
risk. 
To analyze how decision makers use nondiagnostic information in capital budgeting decisions 
and how their preferences for particular types of information unfold when confronted with risk 
and cognitive load, I specify the following model: 
Share of nonfinancial information used = α0 + α1 12 Information Cues + α2 Level of Risk + 
α3 12 Information Cues × Level of Risk +  
where 12 Information Cues is a dummy variable that equals 1 for treatments with 12 cues of 
information and zero for treatments with 6 cues of information. Level of Risk is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 for treatments with high risk decision scenarios and zero otherwise. 12 
Information Cues x Level of Risk is the interaction variable of the two preceding variables. I run 
this model for the sample, excluding the treatments without information cues in addition to 
NPV as there is no nondiagnostic information available for participants to integrate in their 




In Model 3 the coefficient of 12 Information Cues is negative and significant (α1=-0.076, 
p=0.01). This result remains consistent in Model 4, in which I introduced Level of Risk. Hence, 
I can assert that an increasing number of nondiagnostic information cues or cognitive load 
reduces the share of nonfinancial information included in the capital budgeting decision 
process. The coefficient of Level of Risk in Model 4 is not statistically significant, however, 
when I integrated the interaction variable of 12 Information Cues and Level of Risk in Model 5, 
all independent variables become statistically significant. 12 Information Cues (α1=-0.191, 
p=0.01) remains to be statistically significant, although the coefficient increases, so that more 
nondiagnostic information drives decision makers to use almost 20% less nonfinancial 
Explanatory Variables
12 Information Cues (IC) -0.076 *** -0.076 *** -0.191 ***
Level of Risk -0.022 -0.138 ***
Level of Risk * 12 IC 0.232 ***
Constant 0.518 *** 0.529 *** 0.587 ***
Clustered
Number of Observations (N)
Adjusted R-squared 0.0144 0.0502
12 Information Cues  is a binary variable that describes the the number of nondiagnostic information 
cues provided to participants in our experiment in each decision round that could be used for decision 
making purposes
Level of Risk  is a binary variable that describes whether the participant in our experiment has been 
exposed to a low risk decision context or a high risk decision context
TABLE 8
Additional OLS Regression Models
Dependent Variable: 
Share of Nonfinancial Information Used
Model 3 Model 5





Exp. ID Exp. ID
480 480
 
information as compared to a scenario with less nondiagnostic information provided. Further, 
Level of Risk (α2=-0.138, p=0.01) puts an additional cognitive strain on decision makers in a 
capital budgeting regime, so that the share of nonfinancial information used is lowered as well 
by 13.8%. The interaction variable 12 Information Cues x Level of Risk assumes a positive 
coefficient and is also significant at the .01 percent level (α3=0.232, p=0.01).  
 
To scrutinize the interaction effect in more detail, the interaction plot is portrayed in figure 1. 
With relatively low amount of nondiagnostic information in a low risk decision scenario, 
decision makers integrate more nonfinancial information into their decision process. An 
observation that is in line with behavior suggested by accounting literature. However, when the 
amount of nondiagnostic information cues increases, ceteris paribus, the cognitive load reduces 
the share of nonfinancial information used because decision makers revert to financial cues 
instead. This effect is attributed to the degree of familiarity decision makers have with different 
types of information cues. Under cognitive load, decision makers prefer information that is 
familiar, in my experiment, this is financial information. Analyzing the degree of familiarity, I 






Low risk High risk
Figure 1
Interaction Plot
6 Information cues 12 Information cues
 
compared to nonfinancial ones (t(239)=6.57, p=0.01). In a high-risk decision context, 
regardless of how much nondiagnostic information is provided, decision makers converge 
towards an even share of financial and nonfinancial information cues. My result suggests that 
in high risk decision scenarios, where according to finance and accounting scholars the benefits 
of integrating nonfinancial information into the decision process are the highest, decision 
makers tend to view different types of information indifferently. Hence, I can confirm H2 that 
decision makers use more nonfinancial information only when risk and cognitive load is 
relatively low.  
2.5  Discussion and conclusion 
 
My study investigates the dilution effect caused by nondiagnostic information in capital 
budgeting decisions. Moreover, I examine the influence of risk and cognitive load decision 
makers’ capital budgeting behavior, particularly their preferences in different types of 
information. Although my experiment is chiefly concerned with the ramifications of additional 
nondiagnostic information in capital budgeting, my findings also contribute to the ongoing 
discourse about the role of financial and nonfinancial measures in these types of decisions. 
Hence, I also explore the question of whether nonfinancial financial information is really used 
by decision makers, especially in situations where risk and cognitive load prevails.  
My results show that nondiagnostic information creates a dilution effect in capital budgeting 
decisions such that decision makers reduce investments. I find this effect to be more pronounced 
as more nondiagnostic information is provided. My results also show that decision makers 
exposed to high risk invest significantly less as compared to their peers in a low-risk setting. 
Furthermore, I find decision makers to use more nonfinancial information in their decision 
processes in the absence of risk and cognitive load. This is in line with general advocacy in 
accounting literature, to compliment capital budgeting decisions with nonfinancial information 
to form a more profound decision fundament. However, decision makers behavior changes 
 
when exposed to high cognitive load, which leads to a reduction of nonfinancial information, 
such that more familiar financial information is used. In the light of high risk, decision makers 
show indifferent behavior towards financial and nonfinancial information. 
My study helps to address the scarcity of research in the area of capital budgeting behavior. 
First, my study adds to a growing stream of literature on the use of information and provides 
evidence that more information is not necessarily better (Shanteau 1992; Waller and 
Zimbelman 2003; Eppler and Mengis 2004; McKinsey Global Institute 2018). More 
nondiagnostic information amplifies suboptimal capital budgeting behavior. Rather than 
providing large amounts of information to decision makers, irrespective of its helpfulness, I 
advocate limiting the amount of information. The significance of this suggestion has never been 
as important as today because the sheer amount of information has substantially increased over 
the last decade and technological information systems continue to decrease the costs of 
information that can be provided to managers (Brown-Liburd et al. 2015; McKinsey Global 
Institute 2018). Second, I provide evidence of a dilution effect in capital budgeting decisions 
due to an overload of information that encourages suboptimal decision making. This outcome 
underlines the importance of providing information that is specifically diagnostic to managers 
in capital budgeting decisions, rather than providing a large set of information that is 
nondiagnostic. Third, although I issued only nondiagnostic information to decision makers in 
my experiment, I could observe varying preferences towards different types of information 
depending on the decision context. I showed that more nonfinancial information was only used 
in the absence of cognitive load and risk. With an increase in cognitive load, decision makers 
reverted to familiar financial information, while high risk made decision makers indifferent 
towards different types of information. This finding is particularly important because (1) it 
stands in stark contrast to general advocacy of accounting literature to integrate more 
nonfinancial information into decision processes when risk is high (Sundem 1975; Myers 1984; 
 
Ross 1995; Verbeeten 2006; Chen 2008) and (2) cognitive load originating from the amount of 
information drives decision makers to overemphasize more familiar information, which may 
be suboptimal for the decision process (Tversky and Kahneman,1973; 1974; Whitney et al., 
2008; Gerhardt et al., 2013; Benjamin et al., 2013). 
Besides the above contributions, my results also have direct managerial implications. In 
particular, my findings can help to design information systems in capital budgeting. It is not 
only the amount of information that is relevant and should be taken into account by firms, but 
also the type of information, depending on the level of risk and cognitive load in certain settings. 
As such, I can provide guidance on how to structure and improve the process of capital 
budgeting where the actual decision of investing is at the core. 
Like any other scholarly work, this study is subject to some limitations that could stimulate 
future research. First, I have conducted a laboratory experiment, which is, by definition, a 
simplification of a real-world situation. Hence, field research with corporate managers facing a 
similar scenario could make a valuable contribution. Such research would also provide an 
opportunity to observe different levels of investment experience, as managers may or may not 
have encountered certain corporate capital budgeting decisions. Second, I issued the additional 
nondiagnostic information to the participants in the form of an unstructured overview to 
preclude perception biases. Yet some research has shown that the presentation of information, 
particularly measures, can be of importance for the observer, as discussed by Cardinaels and 
van Veen-Dirks (2010). Subsequent research could investigate how the presentation of 
nondiagnostic information affects the decision setting examined in my study. Third, I provided 
nondiagnostic information only, which means that my results concerning decision makers’ 
preferences of different information types under distinct circumstances would also need to be 
validated on its robustness using settings with diagnostic information.  
 
Finally, I have merely conducted a first examination of how capital budgeting decisions are 
affected in light of nondiagnostic information and risk. I believe that there are other factors 
besides these two aspects that can influence managers’ capital budgeting behavior under the 
defined circumstances. Hence, it is desirable to pursue scholarly work to foster a more concise 










Intrapreneurship is an integral strategic approach of large corporations to access additional 
profit pools through new venture creation. The purpose of this study is to investigate the role 
of top management in intrapreneurship and shed light on the conducive ramifications for 
intrapreneurship from creating an intrapreneurial environment in an established organization. I 
provide theoretical explanations enlarged by evidence from case studies to develop a 
management questionnaire for intrapreneurs. The empirical survey data delineates the 
relationship between top management support (TMS) and intrapreneurship as well as the 
mediation effect on that relationship stemming from characteristics of intrapreneurial 
environment. In line with my expectations, I find that TMS has a positive influence on 
intrapreneurship project success, while its impact on intrapreneurship project innovativeness is 
arguably negative. As I hypothesized, some characteristics of intrapreneurial environment are 
particularly beneficial for project innovativeness. My results also confirm that an intrapreneur’s 






It has long been recognized that intrapreneurship, or corporate entrepreneurship, has generated 
substantial successes in creating product innovation and profit growth for established 
corporations (Ireland et al., 2006a, b; Morris et al., 2010). While Pinchot (1985) defines 
intrapreneurship strictly as the practice of developing novel ventures within an existing 
organization, to exploit a new opportunity and create economic value, Antoncic & Hisrich 
(2003) view intrapreneurship less constrained, but just as appropriate, as the behaviors that are 
related to the departures from customary ways of doing business in existing organizations. Due 
to shortening company lifespans, there has been a growing interest in the use of intrapreneurship 
as a means for corporations to facilitate innovative activities of their employees and, at the same 
time, enhance corporate performance through the implementation of new business ventures 
(Cooper, 1998; Deloitte, 2015; Innosight, 2018). However, the establishment of successful 
intrapreneurship in corporations is difficult, because intrapreneurial activity is a bottom-up 
initiative that challenges fundamental principles of mature organizations. While some 
researchers in management accounting have already captured valuable understanding on the 
creative processes fostering in particular the initiation of intrapreneurship projects (Grabner, 
2007; Brüggen, Feichter & Williamson, 2017), the comprehensiveness of intrapreneurship is 
not yet established. The importance of intrapreneurship requires the allocation of further 
management accounting research efforts to understand the underlying mechanisms driving 
intrapreneurship in order to facilitate the design of management control systems for 
intrapreneurs and intrapreneurial behavior. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role 
of top management in intrapreneurship and understand the conducive ramifications for 
intrapreneurship from creating an intrapreneurial environment in an established organization.  
 
Using a mixed method approach3, this study sets out to bring together management accounting 
and intrapreneurship literature to analyze how companies facilitate intrapreneurship projects. 
An intrapreneur is generally confronted with balancing working time between daily work 
routines and intrapreneurial activities. While structural flexibility in smaller firms grants 
intrapreneurs to grapple with entrepreneurial initiatives, process-oriented structures in large 
firms restrict employees’ time resources for activities outside their predefined work tasks 
(Burgelmann, 1984; Kuratko et al. 1990; Carrier, 1994; Antoncic & Hisrich, 2001; Bamber et 
al. 2002). Facilitating effective intrapreneurship is therefore contingent upon the top 
management team’s ability to balance between conventional business with near-term 
objectives, so-called exploitation, and new business ventures with long-term objectives, so-
called exploration (Smith & Tushman, 2005). Similarly, corporate hierarchy inhibits 
intrapreneurs’ work discretion. In particular, decision-making competencies are usually 
centralized, such that decision processes require long lead times and substantial efforts for 
preparation (Dean & Sharfman, 1996; Papadakis et al., 1998; Lyon et al., 2000). 
intrapreneurship, however, is reliant upon a high degree of decision autonomy to facilitate 
decentralized decision-making for those who carry out intrapreneurial undertakings (Kuratko 
et al., 1990; Antoncic & Hisrich, 2001; Alpkan et al., 2010), a condition that is commonly 
scarce in large corporations. To pursue intrapreneurship, intrapreneurs seek to collaborate 
across department boundaries to attain an interdisciplinary network of experts for their 
initiatives (Peters and Waterman 1982; Pinchot 1985; Zahra 1991; Adler & Chen, 2011). Such 
an approach is scarcely endorsed by functional matrix structures prevalent in established 
corporations to date. While intrapreneurs challenge the status quo to create new ventures or 
 
3 This study contributes twofold. First, I conducted 10 structured interviews with corporate managers from different industries responsible for 
intrapreneurship (programs) in their respective companies. The synthesis of these interviews provides comprehensive insights of top 
management support as well as drivers of an effective corporate intrapreneurial environment. Second, I surveyed 63 intrapreneurs in a 
multinational corporation to probe whether top management support can induce an intrapreneurial environment that influences intrapreneurial 
project success. 
 
product innovations, corporations tend to sustain the status quo by means of a so-called 
corporate immune system (Sykes, 1984; Birkinshaw & Ridderstråle, 1999).  
Research by Hornsby et al. (2009) suggests that with an increasing managerial level these 
structural deficiencies can be alleviated to implement more entrepreneurial ideas. While these 
results indicate that top management support (TMS) may be beneficial to intrapreneurs, 
previous studies have also found that what begins as support can turn into disturbance (Millson 
et al., 1992), particularly so, when projects require deep technological understanding (Ettlie et 
al., 1984; Takeuchi & Nonaka, 1986). Research by Dess et al. (2003) and Phan et al. (2009) 
underlines that there is still an important need to demonstrate how firms build effective 
structures and processes to foster intrapreneurship.  
In the management accounting literature the role of top managers has only been thoroughly 
investigated in new product development (Davila, 2000; Bisbe & Otley, 2004; Davila et al., 
2009; Jørgensen & Messner, 2010; Bedford, 2015). These studies demonstrate that 
management involvement along a structured process can have positive ramifications. For more 
iterative, creative and bottom-up driven processes as for intrapreneurship projects, this question 
remains unanswered. 
My study considers TMS not only a prerequisite for intrapreneurship, but also an antecedent 
for intrapreneurial environment, which in itself, is a key factor of successful intrapreneurship. 
Unlike prior studies focusing on systematic product development projects, the unit of analysis 
in my study is the intrapreneurship project itself. While TMS has been widely researched for 
formalized product development, my work describes the role of TMS for iterative and bottom-
up driven intrapreneurial projects. Further, this work contributes new evidence to the unsettled 
discussion of how TMS can create an intrapreneurial environment that drives the success of 
intrapreneurship. Lastly, my study attempts to prevent confounding effects that could stem from 
 
varying characteristics on firm level. This is why only data from large multinational 
corporations (MNC) have been collected for the purpose of this study.  
The next part of this paper reviews previous research on the role of top management support in 
intrapreneurship and presents the underlying theoretical frameworks of the study. Section 3 
depicts intrapreneurship through the lens of four representative case studies from large 
corporations. These cases delineate the variables of the study as well as the hypotheses. The 
following section develops the hypotheses for the empirical test based upon theory as well as 
case findings. Section 5 illustrates the research design for the survey. The last two sections 
discuss the results of the study and conclude with future research propositions. 




The objective of intrapreneurship is to enable employees in large organizations to translate 
novel business ideas into an operational product, service or process that contributes to overall 
firm performance (Dess & Lumpkin, 2005). The process of intrapreneurship is bottom-up and 
projects advance based on a hypothesis-driven approach and concretize over time through 
experimental validation of the latter. Due to the rather explorative nature, it is possible that the 
final product or service deviates from the initial idea, which is why intrapreneurship projects 
require particular top management attention and safeguarding to evolve. For this reason, prior 
research proposes management involvement across the different stages of an intrapreneurship 
project (Burgelman, 1983; Gilbert & Bower, 2002). 
First, managers need to impose strategic constituents, while allowing autonomous 
entrepreneurial initiatives at the operational level to happen. Second, an experimentation-and-
selection approach has to be facilitated to enable decentralized decision-making on the project 
level. This step in particular requires the activation of middle level managers. Third, top 
managers must recognize the strategic relevance of intrapreneurial activities to disseminate 
 
legitimization of these undertakings firm-wide. Fourth, it is the task of top management to be 
concerned about the pace and magnitude of change inflicted on the organization through the 
projects rather than the actual content. Lastly, new managerial approaches are necessary to 
facilitate collaboration between intrapreneurs and the organization in which they work. 
Although described as linear, this process is iterative and distinct from institutionalized new 
product development (NPD) processes. Therefore, continuous, but primarily situation-based, 
TMS is expedient in intrapreneurship. 
3.2.2 Top management support and intrapreneurial environment 
 
Prior studies on the role of top management explore goal specificity, project dedication and 
resource allocation in new product development (NPD) particularly (Cooper, 1988; Pinto et al., 
1993; Swink, 2000). Empirical research finds that TMS and resource commitment relates to 
successful NPD, while the lack thereof has adverse effects (Swink, 2000). Furthermore, there 
is consensus in the academic discourse that inadequate leadership has detrimental ramifications 
on NPD initiatives (Swink, 2000). Zirger and Maidique (1990) find that TMS attracts ambitious 
talent across functional domains within an organization. A high level of top-down management 
commitment draws in development personnel that assumes NPD project ownership and 
becomes more willing to take risks. In addition, dedicated TMS creates enthusiasm among 
project participants catering to persistent goal achievement. Research by Swink et al. (1996) 
alludes to the importance of involved top managers in NPD as they have the ability to attain 
resources for unanticipated project expenditures. 
Although there is general consensus on the beneficial nature of TMS, other perspectives have 
raised the question of whether TMS is always contributing to NPD project success. Gersick et 
al. (1990) state that TMS can turn into controlling, even interference, of the project 
management. This effect appears to be more severe the higher the technological advancement 
is within a project (Takeuchi & Nonaka, 1986; Swink, 2000). Under those circumstances, 
 
scholars have suggested that deep technological understanding and experience in managing 
innovative projects take the place of TMS as key determinants of NPD success (Song & 
Montoya-Weiss, 1998). 
While the impact of TMS on NPD projects is well established in the existing literature, 
scholarly work that links TMS with rather creative and iterative intrapreneurship proceedings 
is still scarce. A number of studies have investigated the relationship between organizational 
support and intrapreneurial project success (Antoncic, 2001; Antoncic, 2007; Rutherford & 
Holt, 2007; Alpkan et al., 2010). The organizational support construct is multifaceted and 
integrates different organizational antecedents such as management support, time and resource 
availability, work discretion and loose intra-organizational boundaries (Antoncic & Hisrich, 
2001; Hornsby et al., 2003; Hayton, 2005). Recent studies have acknowledged the confounding 
effects of the construct and began to model antecedents distinctly to gain a more granular 
understanding of intrapreneurship (Hornsby et al., 2002; Antoncic & Zorn, 2004; Holt & 
Rutherford, 2007; Alpkan et al., 2010). 
TMS is essential for generating new projects and awaking entrepreneurial spirit within an 
organization (Kuratko and Montagno 1989). The essence of effective performance under 
entrepreneurial spirit is concerned with employees’ ability to manage uncertainty and to deal 
with different circumstances and boundaries with degree of their personal expertise (Schuler 
1986). TMS in this situation is the problem solving and conflict resolution ingredient in the 
intrapreneurial undertaking. It is required in the idea generation, development, and particularly 
implementation stages of the ideas (Burgelman, 1983). 
Time availability is the sufficiency of time resources to work on creating new ideas and 
implementing novel business ventures (Brazeal, 1993; Schuler, 1986; Kuratko et al., 1990). 
Although some ambitious intrapreneurs pursue their intrapreneurial initiatives in their spare 
time (Van den Ende et al., 2003), time availability for personnel is a crucial determinant for 
 
both an intrapreneur’s day-to-day work as well as intrapreneurial ideation, for example, to 
experiment and develop (e.g. Pinchot, 1985; Fry, 1987). Provision of designated time resources 
encourages employees to dwell on new business ventures with the result of putting their ideas 
into action (Sundbo 1999; Hornsby et al., 2002).  
Another factor of an intrapreneurial environment is decision autonomy within the 
organizational structure, especially work discretion for employees. An effective intrapreneurial 
environment encompasses top management that encourages decentralized decision-making as 
an element of corporate strategy (Mintzberg, 1973; Khandwalla, 1973; Slevin & Covin, 1990; 
Covin & Slevin, 1989; Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999). Decision autonomy empowers employees 
to steer their projects independently (Lober, 1998; Kuratko et al., 1992; Hornsby et al., 2002) 
and implement novel ideas to seize business opportunities (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; 2001). 
Autonomy extends to an employees’ degree of initiative upon their formal work and 
implementing improvement efforts or resolving problems (Tatikonda & Rosenthal, 2000). 
Autonomous employees or managers can think, act, and afford to risk more for innovative 
consequences, and they can afford to allow others’ freedom. 
Creative work paired with the opportunity to collaborate cross-functionally is yet another driver 
of innovative initiative in firms (Gapp & Fisher, 2007). Where well-trained, diverse teams are 
proactively encouraged to work together innovative outcomes can be increased (Bantel & 
Jackson, 1989; Alpkan et al., 2010). As for intrapreneurship, intrapreneurs require the 
collaboration to conceive innovative concepts in early ideation, while also needing different 
competencies to creating complex novel business offerings, or even entirely new ventures. 
Enabling collaboration across department borders, even firm borders, is in top managers range 
of influence. Again, intrapreneurship challenges fundamental structural antecedents of 
established organizations, which are commonly managed in matrix or even silo structures and 
naturally inhibit interdisciplinary cooperation.  
 
As prior literature shows, scholarly research to date offers a variety of different determinants 
of intrapreneurship success. It is not clear what factors are determinants for intrapreneurial 
success. Prior studies do not define a no consistent set of antecedents that isolates the key 
drivers of intrapreneurship projects. The reasons for this lack of consistency can be dissected 
into two constituents. First, scholars view intrapreneurship as a means to generate a particular 
outcome that positively contributes to firm performance. However, it is inconsistent, if not 
undefined, what the potential outcomes of intrapreneurial activity ought to be. While some 
researchers’ interest is on rather intangible dimensions such as entrepreneurial mindset or 
proactiveness of employees, others focus on more tangible outcomes, for example, new 
ventures or new patents. Second, until today, scholarly work has strongly cultivated debates on 
a theoretical level mainly revising or reiterating theoretical fundament in the space of 
intrapreneurship, while neglecting the step of revisiting practitioners and reevaluating the 
current intrapreneurship efforts in practice. It is for that reason, I set out to contribute more 
clarity in this respect to the academic literature by going to the field. As a means to acquire in-
depth practical knowledge, case studies provide invaluable insights into the mechanism behind 
intrapreneurship and reveal the actual success drivers that make intrapreneurship work in 
established corporations. 
3.3 Case Studies 
 
To understand how corporate managers structure intrapreneurship (programs), I identified the 
250 largest companies in Europe by the number of employees. Applying a systematic web 
research, I was able to identify firms that officially announced their intrapreneurship activities. 
From that, I backtracked contact information of the individuals in charge of intrapreneurship in 
the respective organizations. Of all inquired individuals, I received the opportunity to speak to 
10 MNCs from four different countries across Europe. I interviewed the manager responsible 
for planning, implementing and overseeing the company’s intrapreneurial activities. To extend 
 
the still scarce literature on TMS in intrapreneurship, I decided to follow an exploratory 
approach by using case studies to build knowledge about this phenomenon. Interviews were 
guided by 18 questions focused on the formal system and the intrapreneurial initiatives 
themselves. All questions were open-ended, this gave me the opportunity to adjust depending 
on the configuration of the company’s intrapreneurial approach without losing direction overall. 
Appendix B shows the interview questionnaire. I selected four of the ten case studies conducted. 
This helped me to reduce overlap as well as redundancies in the managers’ responses while 
providing a wide variance in perspectives from the different interviewees. Hereafter, I describe 
the cases on the diversity of intrapreneurship and the characteristics of TMS.  
Manager A 
Manager A worked for a large manufacturing company in Northern Europe. For the company’s 
intrapreneurial activities, the manager had built an entire department solely dedicated to the 
company’s intrapreneurs. The manager was still in charge of operating the day to day work, 
which mainly encompassed “bringing people together to make collaboration and innovation 
happen”. The main objective of the program was to enable any employee to become an 
intrapreneur and to find support to develop a solution for a particular customer problem that 
has been detected through daily work and/or from private observations. In the initial stage of 
the project, the manager mainly focused on sparing with the intrapreneurs as this process would 
determine whether or not someone was serious about their initiative or not. There was no fixed 
project duration as each intrapreneur would work “at his/her own pace, just like anywhere else 
in working life”. 
As projects exceled, the manager ensured that a committee of sponsors would be made aware 
of these projects. The committee consisted of key top managers from R&D, Production, 
Business Development as well as Sales & Marketing. On a quarterly basis this committee would 
come together to assess projects on two criteria, whether the project had the potential for a 
 
significant contribution to the firm’s bottom line and if it had a strategic fit. According to the 
manager “some very creative projects with great potential were not pursued as it was unclear 
how they would integrate into corporate strategy”. Up to this point, the intrapreneur would work 
on the project alongside daily work tasks. The reason for that was to “demonstrate personal 
commitment”. Given a positive decision outcome from the committee of sponsors, an 
intrapreneur would be granted a 5-digit budget to continue working on the project, while 
receiving access to methodological and collaboration opportunities from the internal 
intrapreneurship department. The budget would be under full discretion of the intrapreneur and 
could be invested as the intrapreneur saw fit. The main goal at this stage was to “iterate towards 
a clearly identifiable customer problem”. Intrapreneurs would also be permitted to use twenty 
percent of working time or 1 day a week for their respective projects. 
In case the business proposal showed traction and customers were fond of the proposed product 
or service, intrapreneurs were once more invited to present their project in front of the 
committee; all other projects were terminated. If the committee could be convinced by the 
preliminary results, the project was implemented. Along with great management attention, 
intrapreneurs’ reward would consist of two elements. First, the manager would be preferred for 
internal promotion or, if required, manage the business area that originated from the 
intrapreneurship project altogether. Second, the manager would get the opportunity to present 
the project in front of an audience of interested colleagues and serve as mentor for other 
intrapreneurs. This was considered an important incentive for intrapreneurship in that firm. 
Manager B 
Manager B had built an intrapreneurship program for an international telecommunications 
company. The program was supported by a board member responsible for HR, innovation and 
organizational development. At the time of the interview, the program had already been running 
 
for 6 years and the manager had been in charge throughout that time, which gave me access to 
a great deal of experience in intrapreneurship. 
The key objective of the program was to “build business ventures that secure a profitable share 
in new markets for the firm and that are so-called investable”. Hence, intrapreneurs had to create 
a project roadmap with concrete milestones and a budget that a decision committee could invest 
in. To accomplish this, the program was divided into two phases, an exploration and execution 
stage. The exploration stage was fulltime and lasted 3 months. To get in, potential candidates 
needed to convince a jury consisting of managers running the intrapreneurship program as well 
as outside entrepreneurs and experts. During those 3 months, intrapreneurs were coached one-
on-one by experienced entrepreneurs from outside the organization and collectively received 
training in project management, business modeling as well as design thinking. “The goal is to 
equip our intrapreneurs with the necessary skill-set to concretize the business idea.” Once the 
exploration stage was completed, intrapreneurs present their ventures to a decision committee 
of top managers including the sponsoring board member. Based on the committee’s assessment, 
the project was either terminated or equipped with significant funding to proceed to the 6-12 
months execution stage. Upon entering the execution stage, intrapreneurs had the opportunity 
to showcase their ventures at an internal fair to recruit colleagues to join their undertaking 
fulltime and/or span a network of supporters in the organization. Top management empowered 
the intrapreneurs such that crucial decisions on the project could be taken freely by the 
intrapreneurs themselves. For instance, “it is up to any intrapreneur’s discretion on where to 
locate the project team or how to allocate the project budget”. Following the execution stage, 
intrapreneurs were asked to provide evidence on the viability of the business and the “investable 
proposal” for the decision committee to determine how to proceed with the project. Two 
possible options existed. Either the project was terminated and the intrapreneur went back to 
his former corporate position or the project was transferred into a new entity within the 
 
organization and the intrapreneur assumed responsibility over the business. This was highly 
important, as from the experience gained in the program, it was clear to the manager that 
decoupling intrapreneurs from their projects at a rather early stage would likely result in project 
failure as one would lose the returns of the “sweat and tears” an intrapreneur had already 
invested into the project. 
Manager C 
Manager C had been overseeing the intrapreneurship program of an automotive company for 
more than 8 consecutive years. The program’s objective was to fund intrapreneurs to build 
innovative, high-growth businesses that could create a positive impact for the firm on two 
levels, top-line contribution and build-up of new expertise. Sponsorship of the program was 
held by different stakeholders, represented in the program’s core team, which counted five 
members and consisted of an innovation expert, a program expert, a controlling expert, an 
experienced company manager as well as a representative from the works council. The latter 
two were also part of the 15 people decision committee. According to Manager C, the size of 
the committee did not reduce speed of decision-making for two reasons, (1) the committee days 
were fixed in everyone’s calendar and (2) if someone was unable to attend, decisions were taken 
regardless. The committee comprised additional works council representatives and a member 
of the board of management; while its task was to continuously assesses the intrapreneurship 
projects for the duration of the program. “As a result of the numerous supporters, the program 
enjoys substantial visibility within the organization and draws curious attention from potential 
intrapreneurs.” The full length of the program was made up of 7 stages: idea submission, idea 
pre-selection, idea pitch, incubator phase, business pitch, accelerator phase and final evaluation.  
Anyone within the organization could submit project ideas to the intrapreneurship program 
through the company’s intranet. Naturally, the submitted project ideas exhibit a wide degree of 
innovativeness spanning from minor process optimizations over new product developments to 
 
completely new venture opportunities, therefore, a pre-selection by the program’s core team 
determined projects’ eligibility and potential before proceeding to the project idea pitch. Other 
submissions were declined. For preparing the idea pitch, candidates received access to a 
resource database with valuable content and inspiration that was meant to guide the 
development of their own pitch document. The idea pitch took place on a quarterly basis in 
front of the decision committee and usually encompassed 10-20 project proposals. Every 
member of the committee had equal voting rights and the vote was issued anonymously using 
a mobile application after every pitch presentation. The most compelling ideas based on a 5-
categorical decision logic entered the incubator phase. During the incubator phase, 
intrapreneurs were mentored and trained in groups using different workshop formats next to 
their regular day jobs over a period of three months. The aim was to develop a comprehensive 
business plan to be presented in front of the decision committee for project funding. All 
candidates of the incubator showcased their projects in the business pitch and requested an 
investment for their initiative. The selection criteria at this point were mainly based on 
“managers’ experience, customer insights and hard numbers”. Hence, only a small number of 
projects proceeded to the 6-12 months fulltime accelerator phase. The fulltime accelerator phase 
was meant to provide sufficient time for the intrapreneurs to develop their product, interact with 
customers and, ideally, converge towards product-market fit. Depending on the product 
development time, this project’s time horizon could also be extended. Participants of the 
accelerator phase were able to recruit particular talent internally using the company’s intranet 
or use part of their budget to hire consultants with relevant skillset to support their projects. 
Intrapreneurs were fully responsible for the project during the accelerator phase including 
budgetary decision and project management. The outcomes of the accelerator phase were 
presented to members of the board of management to display the product/service, milestone 
accomplishments and evidence on product-market fit. At this point, the program ended and it 
 
was determined, whether the intrapreneurial projects were “integrated into a company 
department, became a corporate spin-off or were discontinued”. The intrapreneur’s role usually 
remained linked to the project with varying degree of responsibility. 
Manager D 
Manager D was a business unit board member and also the head of the corporate 
intrapreneurship program. The program had been in place for approximately 2 years with the 
objective to create new revenue streams and explore strategically relevant topics. Strategic 
fields were as such predefined by the program manager in collaboration with senior 
management. According to manager D, intrapreneurial activities within the program had great 
board attention mainly attributed to the close personal connection that manager D shared with 
the CEO. This state of affairs would also come in handy whenever intrapreneurs would need to 
circumvent internal process operations to advance their projects.  The format of the program 
appeared to be rather dynamic, yet I could identify two key stage gates; one being the entry gate 
at the start and the “top management marketplace” at the end of the program. To enter the 
fulltime program, project submissions were evaluated by a small team of 5 people including 
manager D and the assessment was based on an internally developed criteria catalogue. 
However, it was important to ensure that the projects could satisfy the expectations of top 
managers. This meant that projects tended to capture incremental innovation because this would 
have a more immediate benefit for top managers as compared to rather disruptive innovations 
that have a longer time horizon. Each project that entered the program received “sufficient 
funding” and access to a variety of support functions such as training material, dedicated HR 
and IT resources as well as mentors. During this phase, the intrapreneurs would work on their 
own discretion, however, budget decision needed confirmation from manager D as this was 
required by internal revision guidelines. In terms of collaboration, all intrapreneurs were 
motivated to convince colleagues to join their projects. Nonetheless, this was usually difficult 
 
according to manager D as other employees would not be relieved of their day jobs and because 
there was no platform for intrapreneurs to network outside their department or business unit. 
On a half year basis, the top management marketplace took place where “mature projects” were 
presented to a group-wide community of top managers. The goal of this stage gate was to find 
sponsors that would either continue financing the projects or even integrate an intrapreneurial 
project into their departments. 
Discussion of case studies 
Table 1 provides information on the respective understanding of project success and 
innovativeness based on the experience of intrapreneurship program managers in large 
corporations across Europe. Further, table 1 contains consolidated findings on the essential 
drivers of successful intrapreneurial initiatives as well as their manifestations within the 
corporations that participated in the case studies. 
 
  
Manager A Manager B Manager C Manager D
Strategically driven Unlimited Close to the core Incremental
Only constrained by 
strategic fit analyses
No defined restrictions 
for degree of 
innovativeness
Proximity to core 
business as decision 
criteria limited 
innovativeness
Top managers would 
seek to back projects 
with immediate pay-off, 




Low High Medium High
Decision 
Autonomy
High High High Medium
Interdisciplinary 
collaboration
Medium High High Low
Summary of the case studies
TABLE 1
Active supportby 





Sponsorship by top 
management from 
different business areas
Active support by a 
member of the board 
and works council 
representatives
Sponsorship by 





The case studies vividly show that managers are confident in intrapreneurship being the right 
tool to deliver innovation secluded from the core business. What varies, is the degree of 
innovativeness. While some managers expose strategic guidelines or proximity to the core 
business on their intrapreneurs, others only set the target on a profitability and a contribution to 
the organization’s bottom line. Although some of the programs follow a basic step-wise logic, 
the activities within the steps are meant to be iterative and under discretion of the intrapreneurs. 
All managers confirm that intrapreneurship undertakings are always initiated bottom-up, which 
clearly distinguishes intrapreneurship from their structured counterparts in innovation 
management or NPD. 
General consensus also resonates on the topic of TMS. Not a single intrapreneurship program 
is without the attention of the board of management, either through their involvement in the 
decision committee or as mentor for intrapreneurs. Manager D makes the case that under 
circumstances, it may even be required for intrapreneurship projects to have the support of top 
management because without some initiatives could not excel facing the internal process of a 
large corporation. Without the support of top management many initiatives could not even be 
launched if these were not sponsored and backed by individual or multiple top managers. This 
concerns not only highly innovative projects but any project that is somewhat outside of the 
daily work routine. Hence, based on the case studies I can delineate a causal relationship that 
TMS is an antecedent of intrapreneurship. Similar anecdotal evidence has also been provided 
by the other managers that see TMS to have positive ramifications on organizational inertia and 
resistance as well as speeding up or side-tracking “process clutter”.  
A recurring theme in every case study is time availability, which goes hand in hand with access 
to resources. Managers explain that these two elements are closely linked to the structure of the 
respective programs and thereby to the maturity level of the intrapreneurship project. Although 
Manager A synthetically creates a lack of time availability to challenge intrapreneurs and 
 
“separate the wheat from the chaff”, it is depicted that with a lack of time, intrapreneurs cannot 
effectively pursue their initiatives and it would further hamper with the credibility of the 
intrapreneurship program. Moreover, the case studies reveal that most intrapreneurs are subject 
to some extent of decision autonomy. In most cases intrapreneurs can independently decide 
upon the use of their budget, some may even choose the place of work as long as it serves the 
intrapreneurship project. This autonomy is deemed necessary by the interviewed managers to 
foster intrapreneurs’ motivation, while at same time let the “best informed person in the room 
take the decision”. Lastly, collaboration or interdisciplinary exchange is a recurring element. 
Managers seek great value in the utilization of different skillsets to drive intrapreneurial projects 
forward. Manager B even goes that far to conduct special events for intrapreneurs to showcase 
their projects and attract talent from the core organization in pursuit of their ideas. In the words 
of Manager B, “a single person rarely has all the necessary competencies that are required 
beyond the ideation phase”. 
3.4 Development of research hypotheses 
 
Based on the case studies, I could identify the three key drivers of successful intrapreneurship 
according to intrapreneurship program managers from large European corporations. The 
interview managers determined time availability, decision autonomy and internal network to 
be positively impactful on intrapreneurship. Building on these newly gained insights, I set out 
to understand the role of top managers to facilitate intrapreneurial activity. The responsibility 
of top management to foster successful intrapreneurship can be divided into two perspectives. 
For one, top managers in their capacity have the influence to reshape organizational structures 
to allow and alleviate intrapreneurial activity, and for the other, top managers can affect 
intrapreneurs’ behavior on an individual level. 
According to Young & Jordan (2008), top management support is an important success factor 
for any project within an organization. Other studies indicate that projects, which are under the 
 
supervision of top managers tend to have higher chances of success in comparison to projects 
that are not (Pinto & Slevin, 1987; Sumner, 1999; Belout & Gauvreau, 2004). This is attributed 
to the general strategic importance that top managers’ attention can lend to a particular 
initiative, but also top managers’ personal and budgetary resources that are committed to the 
project to review planning, follow up on results and garner CEO sponsorship. Swink, Sandvig 
& Mabert (1996) relate their findings to particularly innovative projects and show the 
importance of top managers to acquire additional budget for unanticipated resource 
requirements. Another side benefit of top management supported innovation projects is that 
development personnel is encouraged to join as they understand their involvement in these 
projects to offer them personal growth opportunities (Swink, 2000). 
Intrapreneurial projects differentiate themselves from other projects in the sense that they are 
mostly driven bottom-up and can therefore be wrongfully understood by internal stakeholders 
as strategically irrelevant. According to Morton’s (1983) case study research on project 
management, top managers as project champions have the ability to resolve stakeholder 
disagreement. Their authority allows top managers to mobilize opinion leaders in order to build 
general organizational support for the project from different stakeholders. Beyond that, it is in 
their realm to convince other top managers to also foster a positive mindset towards the 
intrapreneurship project, or even make it a priority on their agenda as well. 
On the individual level, top management support manifests through motivation and 
empowerment of the individual intrapreneur. This includes, for example, sharing of 
accumulated managerial experience, offering strategic consulting to challenge crucial project 
assumptions and empower the intrapreneur in daily activities (Hornsby et al., 2002; Kuratko et 
al., 2014). Further, a top manager who shares the intrapreneurship project’s vision and attaches 
explicit objectives to that vision can resolve uncertainties during project execution or 
compensate for imperfections in an intrapreneur’s management skills.  
 
Top management supported projects are also likely to have more safeguarding and monitoring. 
Hence, project participants are likely to be more diligent, goal-oriented and less hesitant to 
conserve budget required to constitute project success. Based on the unique nature of 
intrapreneurship projects and the beneficial ramifications that top management support can lend 
to these types of projects as supported by insights from the case studies, I hypothesize the 
following relationship: 
H1: Top management support is positively associated with intrapreneurship project success. 
In general, organizations are configured in a way to efficiently support the core business 
(Rosemann & vom Brocke, 2015). Although this configuration is usually optimized to deliver 
the current product portfolio, it is detrimental to creating space for innovation or intrapreneurial 
opportunity. As part of this organizational setup, top managers have also institutionalized this 
approach and tend to reinforce the status quo. A behavior that has been observed to be even 
more pronounced among top managers with significant tenure with the firm (Wu, Levitas & 
Priem, 2005; Srivastava & Lee, 2005). 
For large organizations, in particular, short-term incentives of top management lay the focus on 
near-term successes that are primarily related to the management’s department or business unit 
objectives, in other words, their range of influence. This environment is toxic for new venture 
creation and intrapreneurship, which are inherently innovative undertakings that come to full 
fruition only over an extended period of time. It is for that reason, that top managers tend to 
favorize projects that bear a clear near-term benefit to personal incentives, whereas risky long-
term innovation projects with highly uncertain outcomes may not find support. 
Top managers’ strategic foresight may grow into an adverse influence for intrapreneurship 
projects. For instance, a lack of technological understanding on the top management level may 
make it difficult to convince the hierarchy to promote intrapreneurial undertakings. This effect 
is reinforced by the still widely accepted practice to view unsuccessful projects as failures rather 
 
than opportunities for the organization to learn. Inherently, innovative undertakings such as 
intrapreneurship projects bear a higher risk of failure than less innovative activities closely 
linked to the well-understood core business. This culture surrounding top managers and 
intrapreneurs alike poses a threat to personal careers. It discourages intrapreneurs to initiate 
riskier projects and inhibits top managers from supporting those initiatives. 
H2: Top management support is negatively associated with intrapreneurship project 
innovativeness. 
For most mature organizations, innovative undertakings outside the core activities are difficult 
to come by, particularly so, when these undertakings are bottom-up driven like intrapreneurship 
projects. To yet allow these activities to flourish, adequate preconditions have to be established 
for intrapreneurs to pursue their initiatives. Top management plays a crucial role in creating an 
intrapreneurial environment in large organizations that can facilitate intrapreneurship. Unlike 
conventional company projects, intrapreneurship projects require a surrounding that deviates in 
a lot of aspects from typical organizational structures, which is why top management support 
is required to form an entrepreneurially friendly environment. 
While traditional projects tend to use up a lot of time and resources for decision-making 
processes that run up and down corporate hierarchy, an intrapreneurial environment warrants 
intrapreneurs to assume decision responsibility within their intrapreneurship project (Sykes, 
1986; Kuratko, Montagno & Hornsby, 1990). Top managers have the ability to grant and 
promote deviations from typical conduct if this spurs the chances of successful 
intrapreneurship. In the case of equipping intrapreneurs with decision autonomy, managerial 
decision-making is left with the best informed in the project and avoids miscommunication 
across different management levels. As a result, this reduces project delays and scope 
adjustments, while increasing the sense of ownership for the responsible intrapreneurs. 
 
Besides decision autonomy, an adequate intrapreneurial environment provides sufficient time 
and resources to intrapreneurs. Prior research shows that a lack of time and budgetary resources 
limits, if not stops, intrapreneurial activity from hitting important project milestones (Kuratko, 
Montagno & Hornsby, 1990). Antoncic & Hisrich (2001) argue that limited time availability 
substantially impairs intrapreneurs’ ability to drive their projects towards success. This is not 
only because relevant purchases or project contributions cannot be acquired, but it also fosters 
short-sightedness of the intrapreneur, which especially for an innovative undertaking can result 
in long-term failure. Bamber et al. (2002) find empirical evidence that constraints on financial 
resource intrapreneurship reduce the likelihood of high intrapreneurial performance. From 
traditional organizational standpoint, the chances of these detrimental conditions to happen to 
intrapreneurship projects are high, as the projects’ strategic relevance may be misunderstood 
(Swink, 2000; Felekoglu & Moultrie, 2013), the bottom-up approach is not supported or the 
general otherness of the intrapreneurial undertaking is penalized. Top management in support 
of intrapreneurship has the capacity to institutionalize programs that offer an intrapreneurial 
environment, while at the same time providing dedicated resources for intrapreneurial projects.  
Just like any other innovation project, intrapreneurship projects require a unique combination 
of competences and experience in order to create something new (Schumpeter, 1911). Hence, 
inter-departmental collaboration is needed for intrapreneurship to be successful. For one, 
innovative ideas breed under the eyes of experts from different fields and project challenges 
can be tackled using a variety of expertise. Interdisciplinary teams are rarely found in mature, 
matrix-structured organizations, which poses a great threat to innovative undertakings of any 
kind. Here again, top managers are advised to break through the structural deficiencies in order 
to create an intrapreneurial environment that brings together people with different competencies 
and the ambition to pursue intrapreneurship projects. Research by Blackwell et al. (2009) 
 
demonstrates that also the level of innovativeness can be improved through the successful 
collaboration of teams with different areas of expertise. 
Based on the aforementioned arguments, I formulate the following two hypotheses: 
H3a: The relationship between top management support and intrapreneurship project success 
is mediated by the intrapreneurial environment. 
H3b: The relationship between top management support and intrapreneurship project 
innovativeness is mediated by the intrapreneurial environment. 
Figure 1 summarizes the hypothesized relationships illustratively 
 
 
3.5 Research and survey design 
 
I constructed the survey to collect primarily quantitative information in order to reduce the 
chances of perceptual biases. Nonetheless, ex-post rationalization may have been a cause for 
recall biases, which in itself could be a threat to the integrity of the data. To conduct my survey, 
I had to present my approach to both the company’s internal data integrity board and a group 
of expert representatives of the workers’ council. After some minor changes to a small number 
of questions with the sole intent to safeguard employees’ personal data, the survey was 













demographics as this could have enabled ourselves or researchers with access to the raw data 
to potentially backtrack a participant’s identity.  
To deliver the questionnaire to the participants, I was asked to use an internally validated 
software tool, again, with the intention to not be subject to any data privacy issues. The response 
rate was 53% (63 out of 119 emailed surveys). This high response rate was achieved by 
integrating different procedures into the design of the survey (Dillman, 1983). Each survey was 
directly addressed to the intrapreneurs using the software issued by the company. The email 
included a cover letter, the survey and the affirmation that all data collected will be treated with 
the upmost academic standards while following the requirements delineated by the company’s 
internal data integrity board. Completing the survey took between 20-30 minutes. Upon 
finalization of the data collection, a copy of aggregated results of the survey was distributed 
among the respondents. 
3.5.1 Dependent variables 
 
Interviews conducted with 10 managers responsible for intrapreneurship in their firms revealed 
that the evaluation of intrapreneurial projects is most frequently based on the degree of 
innovativeness and the project success. The outcome of intrapreneurship in this study is 
therefore captured by these two characteristics. 
The degree of innovativeness is measured on a five-point Likert scale where respondents were 
asked to assess their projects’ level of innovativeness from their personal viewpoint. As the 
degree of innovativeness is considerably determined by the prerequisites and industrial context 
of the company, I used that as an anchor point for the survey participants. For example, a 
pronounced proximity to the core business is to be associated with lower levels of 
innovativeness, whereas less pronounced proximity is to be related with higher degrees of 
innovativeness.  
 
Similarly, I also used a five-point Likert scale to measure intrapreneurship project success 
asking for the respondents’ personal assessment. Due to projects’ strategic heterogeneity that 
manifested in differing objectives, I was advised by the intrapreneurship program managers to 
broaden the definition of project success to capture the comprehensive benefits of 
intrapreneurial initiatives. For instance, while highly explorative endeavors would be 
considered successful if these were to yield patents to secure intellectual property in a future 
field, while less radical initiatives would be expected to generate topline growth or acquire 
market share in order to be considered a success. Hence, I also provided these criteria as 
reference point to the survey participants as well. 
Although both variables determine the quality of an intrapreneurial project, the constructs are 
distinct, which is why this study treats the dependent variables as two separate outcomes in 
order to validate the partially opposing effects stemming from the independent variables. 
3.5.2 Independent variables 
 
The role of TMS has been investigated in prior studies related to job satisfaction, new product 
design or information systems implementation (Thong, Yap & Raman, 1996; Viswesvaran, 
Deshpande & Joseph, 1998; Swink, 2000). Based on existing literature, TMS consists of three 
items goal setting involvement, progress reporting and project commitment. As top managers 
are usually involved in the definition of corporate strategy, they are aware of strategically 
relevant areas and can thus facilitate a goal setting process that ensures strategic-fit of 
intrapreneurship projects. Based on top managers’ expertise in project tracking, progress 
reporting is a key enabler for intrapreneurs to drive their initiatives forward, while regularly 
integrating feedback from experienced decision-makers (Kuratko, Montagno & Hornsby, 
1990). Moreover, top managers are able to use their influence to mitigate organizational 
resistance that can arise from innovation inhibiting corporate culture or general skepticism 
towards intrapreneurial undertakings. To measure TMS, I applied a five-point Likert scale for 
 
all three items. In order to safeguard inter-relatedness, I computed Cronbach’s alpha for the 
three TMS items (Cronbach, 1951). With a value of 0.9, the internal consistency of the three 
items measuring the TMS construct indicates a high level of reliability. 
Intrapreneurial environments in corporations, as well as its antecedents, have been explored in 
normative academic research almost three decades ago (Kuratko, Montagno, Hornsby, 1990), 
whereas the first comprehensive empirical studies emerged only a decade later (Hornsby, 
Kuratko & Zahra, 2002; Kuratko et al., 2001; Hornsby, Kuratko & Shepherd, 2009; Kuratko, 
Covin & Hornsby, 2014). Until today, construct definitions vary, because, for one, different 
perspectives co-exist for grasping intrapreneurial environment, particularly concerning the 
interplay of its underlying parameters, and, two, there is continuous development in the relevant 
literature. Nonetheless, three components remain constant; time availability, work discretion or 
decision autonomy as well as interdisciplinary collaboration. Given that intrapreneurs do not 
receive sufficient time resources to pursue their projects, because of daily operations or limited 
acceptance for the project by the supervisor, the success of intrapreneurship is endangered. 
Similarly, a lack of decision autonomy may induce critical project delays due to slow decision-
making by less informed supervisors or higher management. For extremely technical and 
innovative intrapreneurship projects, it is paramount to facilitate interdisciplinary collaboration, 
because a cross-functional team with different competencies is able to overcome complex 
project challenges effectively. To measure these variables, I used a five-point Likert scale in 
my survey where I asked intrapreneurs to provide an individual assessment of their work 
environment. Appendix B comprises the respective question. 
3.6 Results 
 
3.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics on variables and related questionnaire items. Project 
Innovativeness stands out, because the Likert scale’s theoretical maximum (5 - strongly agree) 
 
for the item has not been used, resulting in the lowest mean of all variables (1.86). Responses 
by surveyed intrapreneurs indicate that the level of innovativeness has not been perceived 
particularly high. The reason for this could be attributed to the fact that intrapreneurs generally 
are highly innovative and forward-thinking, which is why and these respondents would assess 
intrapreneurship projects to have a comparably low level of innovativeness. Top Management 
Support and Time Availability show the highest means (2.73 and 2.79 respectively), further, 
these two variables are positively correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.33. Moreover, 
TMS is significantly correlated with Internal Network and Project Success (correlation 
coefficient of 0.27 and 0.37 respectively). The analysis also shows a positive and significant 
correlation for Project Success with Time Availability as well as Project Innovativeness with 
Internal Network (correlation coefficient of 0.27 and 0.36 respectively). From the 
intercorrelation matrix one can also see that none of the variables exhibit extremely high 




3.6.2 Hypotheses tests 
 
To test the proposed hypotheses, I conducted multiple OLS regressions that are comprised in 
Table 2 using data from 63 completed surveys. I specify the following model to test H1: 
Project Success = α0 + α1Top Management Support + ε1 
Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Top Management Support 1 5 2.73 1.10 1
Time Availability 1 5 2.79 1.19 0.33 1
Decision Autonomy 1 5 2.02 1.02 0.17 0.19 1
Internal Network 1 5 1.97 1.14 0.27 -0.16 -0.07 1
Project Innovativeness 1 4 1.86 0.98 -0.07 -0.09 -0.05 0.36 1
Project Success 1 5 2.43 1.24 0.37 0.27 0.15 0.24 0.25 1
TABLE 2
Descriptive statistics on variables and 
related questionnaire items
 
The results show a positive and statistically significant relationship between Top Management 
Support and Project Success (α1 = 0.240, p-value < 0.1). The outcome suggests that the support 
of top managers is a prerequisite for the success of intrapreneurship projects in large 
corporations. This finding concurs with similar insights from prior research, where support of 
higher management has been a crucial determinant for new product development or long-term 
oriented strategic projects (Pinto & Slevin, 1987; Sumner, 1999; Belout & Gauvreau, 2004). 
From a perspective of intrapreneurship literature, top management is capable of positively 
influencing the environment for intrapreneurs on an organizational level while encouraging 
intrapreneurs on an individual level to take entrepreneurial risk in order to contribute to 
sustainable company performance (Kuratko, Montagno & Hornsby, 1990; Swink, 2000; 
Hornsby et al., 2009).  
To investigate H2, I construct Model 2 as follows: 
Project Innovativeness = α0 + α1Top Management Support + ε2 
The statistical analysis reveals a non-significant relationship between Top Management 
Support and Project Innovativeness. Moreover, the explanatory power of the model is low with 
an adjusted R-squared of .01, suggesting a suboptimal model fit. Hence, I was unable to confirm 
H2 using model 2, although the coefficient of Top Management Support exhibits a negative 
sign (α1 = -0.143, p-value = 0.162). 
To shed light on how the relationship between Top Management Support and Project Success 
is mediated by factors of intrapreneurial environment, I first formulate Model 3: 
Project Success = α0 + α1Top Management Support + α2Time Availability 
+ α3Decision Autonomy + α4Internal Network + ε3 
The analysis shows that Top Management Support remains to be positive, yet not statistically 
significant related to Project Success (α1 = 0.123). Introducing Time Availability, Decision 
Autonomy and Internal Network as control variables, the outcome reveals that all 
 
intrapreneurial environment variables exhibit positive coefficients, but none are statistically 
significant. Further, Appendix C comprises mediation tests for the respective intrapreneurial 
environment factors using the Sobel test (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). 
Although my preliminary results suggest confirmation that TMS is a key antecedent for an 
intrapreneurial environment, a mediation is not supported. The p-values of the Sobel statistics 
for the variables Time Availability, Decision Autonomy and Internal Network are 0.238, 0.529 
and 0.286 respectively. 
To test H3b, whether intrapreneurial environment factors mediate the relationship between Top 
Management Support and Project Innovativeness, I defined model 4 as follows: 
Project Innovativeness = α0 + α1Top Management Support + α2Time Availability 
+ α3Decision Autonomy + α4Internal Network + ε4 
The analysis shows that Top Management Support remains to be negative and becomes 
statistically significant related to Project Success (α1 = -0.202, p-value < 0.1). The results 
indicate that Time Availability and Decision Autonomy do not have a statistically significant 
impact on Project Innovativeness, whereas the Internal Network is significantly and positively 
related to Project Innovativeness (α4 = 0.343, p-value < 0.01). Based on the outcome, I can 
infer that the provision of a cross-departmental collaboration through an internal company 
network increases the level of innovativeness of intrapreneurial projects. Prior research by 
Blackwell et al. (2009) and Alves et al. (2007) has found evidence on a similar effect in 
innovation management and NPD, it shows that multidisciplinary collaboration fuels creativity 
and supports innovation processes. Analogous to H3a, Appendix C comprises mediation tests 
for the respective intrapreneurial environment factors, again, using the Sobel test. Based on the 
respective models, the p-values of the Sobel test statistics for the variables Time Availability, 
Decision Autonomy and Internal Network are 0.564, 0.793 and 0.069 respectively. The results 
reveal that Internal Network has a significantly positive mediation effect on the relationship 
 
between Top Management Support and Project Innovativeness (α4 = 1.813, p-value < 0.1). 
That implies that the marginal significant negative relationship between TMS and Project 
Innovativeness delineated prior is augmented by facilitating intrapreneurial projects with access 
to a cross-departmental network within the organization. With this end in mind, the provision 
of an intrapreneurial environment that supports internal collaboration is a central duty of top 
managers to ensure high levels of project innovativeness, while reconfirming that their general 
project support does not deter an intrapreneur’s initiative. 
Revisiting the test results for H2, using Model 4 to control for the intrapreneurial environment 
factors, Top Management Support becomes statistically significant for a two-tailed distribution 
(α1 = -0.202, p-value < 0.01). Hence, the impact of supportive top management, also within an 
intrapreneurial environment, still cannot be conclusively delineated. Yet, the statistical results 
align with arguments made prior by Swink (2000), who suggests that top management support, 
and thereby their involvement, can deter a project’s innovativeness due to top managers’ 
potentially low technical understanding required for the project as well as involvement turning 





Top Management Support 0.240 * -0.143 0.123 -0.202 *
Time Availability 0.208 0.052
Decision Autonomy 0.144 0.021
Internal Network 0.111 0.343 ***
Constant 1.643 *** 2.223 *** 0.850 1.510 ***





























3.7 Discussion and conclusion 
 
This study investigates the role of TMS in intrapreneurship and sheds light on the effects an 
intrapreneurial environment has on this relationship. Based on existing literature as well as a 
comprehensive case study, I dissect the constituents of TMS and devise the elements of 
intrapreneurial environment. From the analysis, I develop a comprehensive questionnaire for 
intrapreneurs to examine underlying mechanisms that drive success and innovativeness in 
intrapreneurship projects. I find that TMS has a positive impact on intrapreneurship project 
success, while its effect on intrapreneurship project innovativeness is marginally negative. As 
I hypothesized, characteristics of intrapreneurial environment, like time availability and internal 
network, can also be beneficial for project innovativeness. My results also confirm that an 
intrapreneur’s internal company network positively mediates the relationship between TMS 
and project innovativeness.  
From the results, I find that the role of top managers is ambidextrous. For one, top management 
is responsible for (re-)shaping organizational structures by overcoming innovation adverse 
processes or proactively address middle management concerns. On the other hand, top 
managers need to make way for intrapreneurs themselves, to avoid undermining competent and 
ambitious intrapreneurs in their pursuit of creating a new business venture to contribute to 
overall company performance. Conversely, intrapreneurs expect top managers to assume an 
empowering function that consists of sparring, experience and the provision of their personal 
network. The latter is to be achieved through the creation of an intrapreneurial environment by 
top managers to facilitate intrapreneurs’ pursuit of a venture building. Although some 
interviewees in the case studies have indicated that an artificial time shortage may reveal 
intrapreneurs’ commitment to their projects as selection criteria for intrapreneurs, this study, 
however, suggests that for running intrapreneurship projects time availability can be a 
contributor of success. Consistent with the case studies, the empirical analysis confirms that 
 
particularly for bottom-up initiatives like intrapreneurship, an internal network is critical for 
the success, but also for the innovativeness of intrapreneurship. On the one hand, an internal 
network supports in accelerating processes to overcome organizational inertia, while on the 
other hand, collaboration with colleagues from other disciplines fuels creativity and extends an 
intrapreneur’s problem-solving competence (Dess & Lumpkin, 1999; Kelley et al., 2009).  
This research contributes to the existing body of literature on intrapreneurship. I contribute to 
a growing demand to reevaluate current understanding of intrapreneurship from a practitioner’s 
point of view, as most large corporations still struggle to leverage intrapreneurship to its fullest 
potential4 (Gundogdu, 2012). Further, a reassessment of the top management’s facilitation role 
paired with the insights on intrapreneurial environment as antecedent of successful 
intrapreneurship projects combines latest theoretical fundament with today’s intrapreneurship 
practice in some of Europe’s largest corporations. To the best of my knowledge, the qualitative 
case study data on intrapreneurship program managers is unique and provides unprecedented 
insights how large corporations have institutionalized intrapreneurship. I find that generally 
applicable antecedents of intrapreneurship may not have a significant impact on success and 
innovativeness of intrapreneurship projects. Fundamental research by Antoncic & Hisrich 
(2001) and Hornsby et al. (1990) claims that both environment, as well as organizational 
prerequisites, determine the outcome of intrapreneurial undertakings. My case study insights 
suggest that the primary determinant of intrapreneurship success stems from internal 
circumstances, such as top management support and intrapreneurial environment, only when 
that is given the external perspective comes into play. Compared to prior literature, this study 
delivers new insights from intrapreneurs in a large corporation, because instead of assuming a 
strategic bird’s eye view on the topic at hand, I scrutinize the phenomenon on the level of the 
 
4 Case study participants have signaled that many are still struggling in reaping the full benefits of corporate 
entrepreneurship in their respective firms 
 
intrapreneur. Understanding the organizational requirements from the intrapreneur’s 
perspective is equally important to comprehend intrapreneurship success, particularly because 
intrapreneurship is a bottom-up initiative.  
The role of top managers in intrapreneurship is newly established in my research. In the past, 
researchers have either focused on TMS as component of organizational support in the context 
of intrapreneurship, while others have merely linked TMS with innovation projects or new 
product development (Swink, 2000; Gomes et al., 2001; Islam et al., 2009). My study develops 
creates a new understanding of the responsibilities of top managers in large organizations to 
ensure intrapreneurship success. My empirical results show that top managers’ duties are not 
limited to supporting intrapreneurs on an organizational or individual level, but also facilitating 
intrapreneurial environment to ensures project innovativeness and overall intrapreneurship 
success. 
Like any other scholarly endeavor, this study is subject to some limitations. First, I selected 
case study participants based on web research results of large corporations in Europe that 
publicly communicated their intrapreneurship activities with a dedicated intrapreneurship 
program and accepted to be interviewed when inquired via email through my university. Hence, 
my study may not have inquired corporations active in intrapreneurship, which have not 
publicly announced this or did not respond to my inquiry. Second, the limited sample size of 
119 intrapreneurs as survey participants could be alleviated, however, due to the rather short 
lifespan of institutionalized intrapreneurship the number of intrapreneurs is constraint even 
within large organizations. Third, survey research is commonly subject to perception biases. As 
I questioned intrapreneurs to answer the survey items based on their personal experience, 
perception bias cannot be ruled out in my study either. Fourth, as requirement to conduct survey 
research, it was merely permitted to collect demographics on survey participants. Although this 
request is comprehensible from a data privacy standpoint, I may have missed some important 
 
personal characteristics of intrapreneurs as suggested by prior research on intrapreneurs’ 
personalities (Sayeed & Gazdar, 2003; Camelo-Ordaz et al., 2012; Hydle et al., 2014; 
Mohedano-Suanes & Benitez, 2018). Fifth, although my case studies support the idea that TMS 
is in fact an antecedent of intrapreneurship, it could be argued that this relationship is subject 
to reverse causality because the interviewees in the case study are not the same as the survey 
participants. Nonetheless, the case studies lend support to the described relationship in my 
study, even though in practice one can observe that success has many parents which could 
allude a reverse relationship. Lastly, my entire research has been conducted in Europe, hence 
my findings may not be generally applicable in the US, Asia or other areas of the world as 
cultural differences may require distinct antecedents to induce successful intrapreneurship, 
which may not have been revealed in my study.  
This scholarly work can be extended in several directions. While the role of top managers in 
intrapreneurship is delineated in detail in this paper, the effect of top management incentives 
on the relationship between TMS and intrapreneurship represents a promising area of future 
research. Similarly, the literature lacks an in-depth understanding of intrapreneurs’ incentives 
and their influence on intrapreneurship success. Furthermore, limited empirical work is found 
on the relationship of top managers and intrapreneurs. Trust and confidence in this relationship 
could significantly drive the probability of intrapreneurship success under consideration of the 
bottom-up nature of intrapreneurship. Anecdotal evidence provides accounts that 
intrapreneurship happens in American, European and Asian firms, which raises the question of 
cultural distinctions in intrapreneurship. Lastly, only very few studies have been able dissect 
the economic impact on intrapreneurship at the firm level, because primarily proxies such as 
patents or new ventures have been utilized to date. To advance the knowledge about 
intrapreneurship, the exploration of firm performance implications of intrapreneurship is yet 




In this dissertation, I examine two phenomena related to corporates’ inertia to innovate. First, I 
investigate effects of providing non-diagnostic information in risky capital budgeting decisions 
and how there are limits of providing information to decision-makers to facilitate capital 
budgeting tasks for risky projects. Although decision-makers tend to receive more and more 
information in practice, which is primarily due to decreasing costs to acquire information, my 
research shows that this can trigger suboptimal decision-making due to the integration of 
irrelevant information in the decision process. Whereas a suboptimal resource allocation to 
innovation projects is a main reason for failed corporate innovation (Bladwin, 1991). Second, 
I scrutinize the role of top managers in innovative intrapreneurship projects and how leading 
decision-makers in organizations can facilitate the success of intrapreneurial undertakings. 
While traditional corporate virtues like short-sighted management incentives, limited 
technological expertise and thorough project controlling tend to hinder an innovation-driven 




In chapter 2, my research shows that nondiagnostic information creates a dilution effect in 
capital budgeting decisions thereby reducing investments. I find this effect to be more 
pronounced as more nondiagnostic information is provided. My results demonstrate that 
decision makers exposed to high risk, invest significantly less as compared to their peers in a 
low-risk setting. I find decision makers to utilize more nonfinancial information for their 
decision-making processes in the absence of risk and cognitive load. This is in line with general 
advocacy in accounting literature, to compliment capital budgeting tasks with nonfinancial 
information to generate a more comprehensive decision fundament. However, decision makers’ 
behavior changes when exposed to high cognitive load, which leads to a reduction of 
 
nonfinancial information, such that more familiar financial information is preferred and used. 
In the light of high risk, decision makers show indifferent behavior towards financial and 
nonfinancial information. My findings underline that there are beneficial limits to providing 
more information to decision makers, particularly when these are of nondiagnostic nature. The 
use of nonfinancial information, although deemed recommended by former research, can be 
deteriorated by cognitive load, bringing decision makers to favor familiar, financial 
information. 
In chapter 3, I show that TMS has a positive impact on intrapreneurship project success, while 
its effect on intrapreneurship project innovativeness is arguably negative. My results also 
confirm that an intrapreneur’s internal company network positively mediates the relationship 
between TMS and project innovativeness. From the results, I find that the role of top managers 
is ambidextrous. Top managers are responsible for (re-)shaping organizational structures by 
overcoming innovation adverse processes, while proactively addressing other managers’ 
concerns. Further, top management needs to make way for intrapreneurs themselves, to avoid 
undermining competent and ambitious intrapreneurs in their pursuit of novel business ventures 
to contribute to overall firm performance. Conversely, intrapreneurs expect top managers to 
assume an empowering function that consists of sparring, experience and the provision of their 
personal network. The latter is to be achieved through the creation of an intrapreneurial 
environment by top managers to facilitate intrapreneurs’ pursuit of a venture building. 
Consistent with the case studies, the empirical analysis confirms that particularly for bottom-
up initiatives like intrapreneurship, an internal network is critical for the success, but also for 
the innovativeness of intrapreneurship. 
4.2 Contributions and implications 
 
Chapter 2 adds manifold to the scarcity of research in the domain of capital budgeting behavior. 
First, the study contributes to a growing stream of literature on the use of information in 
 
decision processes and provides empirical evidence that more information is not necessarily 
better. Particularly more nondiagnostic information induces suboptimal capital budgeting 
decisions. Second, I show the existence of the dilution effect to occur also in capital budgeting 
decisions, meaning that the provision of information must also consider whether data is 
diagnostic or nondiagnostic to decision makers, because nondiagnostic information can cause 
a deviation from optimal decision behavior. Third, my study observed that decision makers 
exhibit varying preferences towards different types of information depending on the decision 
context. I show that more nonfinancial information is only used in the absence of cognitive load 
and risk. This indicates that a behavior advocated by leading researchers to integrate 
nonfinancial information into an investment decision is only upheld when decision makers do 
not face challenging circumstances in the decision process. These findings have significant 
managerial implications for example for the design of management information systems in 
capital budgeting. It is not only the amount of information that is relevant but also the type of 
information depending on the level of risk and cognitive load. As such, my research can provide 
guidance on how to structure and improve the process of capital budgeting. 
Chapter 3 contributes to the growing body of literature on intrapreneurship, particularly so from 
a practitioner’s point of view, because most large corporations still struggle to leverage 
intrapreneurship fully, which is why I set out to reevaluate the current understanding in the 
field. Further, a reassessment of the top management’s facilitation role paired with the insights 
on intrapreneurial environment as antecedent of successful intrapreneurship projects combines 
latest theoretical fundament with today’s intrapreneurship practice in some of Europe’s largest 
corporations. My unique case studies provide invaluable insights into the proceedings of large 
corporations in the context of intrapreneurship. My study shows that generally applicable 
antecedents of intrapreneurship may not have a significant impact on success and 
innovativeness of intrapreneurship projects. Fundamental research by Antoncic & Hisrich 
 
(2001) and Hornsby et al. (1990) claims that both environment, as well as organizational 
prerequisites, determine the outcome of intrapreneurial undertakings. My case studies suggest 
that the primary determinant of intrapreneurship success stems from internal circumstances, 
only when that is given the external environment becomes relevant. My study also contributes 
to the existing body of literature by scrutinizing the intrapreneurship phenomenon on the level 
of the intrapreneur, rather than assuming a bird’s eye view on the topic to establish 
topographical understanding. This is particularly valuable because intrapreneurship in its 
essence is a bottom-up initiative. 
In my research, I reestablish the role of top managers in intrapreneurship. While in the past, 
scholars have either concentrated on TMS as a part of organization support in the domain of 
intrapreneurship or focused on TMS in relation to new product development, my study develops 
a new understanding of the responsibilities of top managers in large organizations to enable 
successful intrapreneurial activities. My research shows that top managers’ duties are not 
limited to supporting intrapreneurs on an organizational or individual level, but much more 
facilitating an entrepreneurial environment that allows intrapreneurs to excel with their projects 
from an innovativeness standpoint but also to secure successful outcomes. 
4.3 Limitations and future research 
 
Like any other scholarly work, my study in chapter 2 is subject to some limitations that could 
stimulate future research. First, my research has been conducted in a laboratory setting, which 
makes it by definition a simplification of a real-world environment. Hence, there is great 
opportunity to run field research with corporate managers to gather more evidence to contribute 
this stream of research. Second, in my experiment, I issued nondiagnostic information in an 
unstructured fashion to preclude perception bias. Prior research has shown that the structure 
how information is presented can affect decision outcomes, which is why future research could 
investigate the impact stemming from the way nondiagnostic information is provided to 
 
decision makers. Third, I observed information preferences only for nondiagnostic information, 
which is why research concerning preferences with diagnostic information could confirm the 
idea that information preferences change depending on the decision environment. Lastly, my 
study has merely scrutinized two aspects that can influence managers’ capital budgeting 
behavior. It would therefore be desirable for future research to investigate concrete strategies 
that can alleviate the dilution effect in capital budgeting decisions. 
Chapter 3 also contains some limitations that can be explored by future research. First, I only 
selected case study participants based on a web analysis of large corporations in Europe that 
have publicly announced their intrapreneurship activities with a dedicated intrapreneurship 
program. Hence, my study can be complemented with insights from any corporation whose 
employees are engaging in intrapreneurial activity. Second, the case studies provided support 
for the causal relationship between TMS and intrapreneurship, nonetheless, there is evidence 
that could suggest a reverse-causality, given that many top managers support successful 
intrapreneurial initiatives ex-post. In other words, success has many parents, but failure is 
always an orphan. Third, the limited sample size of 119 intrapreneurs as survey participants 
could be extended and further validated by integrating intrapreneurs from multiple 
organizations with awareness to the increasing complexity of the statistical models. Fourth, my 
survey research can be subject to perception bias, which is why more scholarly work in this 
context to triangulate findings can reduce the risk of perception bias in my study. Fifth, as 
requirement to conduct my survey research, I was not permitted to collect all relevant 
demographic data of the participants, which would have been insightful to understand more 
about the personality and origin of the intrapreneurs, these differences could surely be explored 
in future research. Similarly, my study has taken a purely European perspective on 
intrapreneurship, which is why it would certainly be interesting to compare my findings with 
 
insights from other regions of the world, for example China, Japan or the US, to reveal cultural 
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6. Appendix A – Experimental details chapter 2 
 




















6.2  Part 2 – Post experimental questionnaire 
 
 
Post Experiment Questionnaire  
Please fill in the questionnaire below as final part of the experiment you participated in. 
Thank you very much.   
 
Your experimental ID number:  
 
1. I perceive the context I was assigned to as being highly uncertain   
strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
 
2. I am ________ years old.  
 





4. My nationality is ______________ 
 
5. I am familiar with the concept of Net cash flow  
strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
 
6. I am familiar with the concept of Timing of cash flow 
strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
 
7. I am familiar with the concept of Interest Rate 
strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
 
8. I am familiar with the concept of Project duration 
strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
 
9. I am familiar with the concept of Product sales 
strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
 
10. I am familiar with the concept of Product costs 
strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
 
11. I am familiar with the concept of Product test results 
strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
 
12. I am familiar with the concept of Projected GDP growth rate in the target market 
strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
 
13. I am familiar with the concept of Projected industry growth rate in the target market 
strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
 
14. I am familiar with the concept of Inflation rate in the target market 
strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
  
15. I am familiar with the concept of Unemployment rate in the target market  
strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
 
 
16. I am familiar with the concept of Industry position 
strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
 
17. I am familiar with taking investment decisions    
 
strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
 
18. The experiment was easy to comprehend  
strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
 
19. I feel that I received enough information  
strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
 
20. I feel that I received too much information  
strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
 
21. I enjoyed the experiment  
strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
 
22. I have strong analytical skills    
strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree 
 
23. Assume you are working full time for a company. You are compensated with a fixed salary of € 1500,- 
per month. Furthermore assume you had the choice between the following alternatives for the next month: 
  
 Alternative 1: You will earn again € 1500,- with certainty. 
  
Alternative 2: You will earn € 1200 with certainty and with a probability p you will receive an additional bonus 
of € 600,-.  
  
How large must the probability p be for you to accept alternative 2?   _________ 
 
 
24. In this experiment, I have tried to maximize my pay off.  




7. Appendix B – Survey details chapter 3 
 






1 What is your definition of intrapreneurship?
2 Who is in charge of the intrapreneurship program in your firm?
3 What is the objective of intrapreneurship program?
4 Who is eligible to become part of the intrapreneurship program?
5 How is the intrapreneurship program governed?
6 How is the intrapreneurship program structured?
7 What does the intrapreneurship program encompass?
8 How is the top management involved in the intrapreneurship program?
9 How is the board of management involved in the intrapreneurship program?
10 How much time do intrapreneurs have to pursue their projects?
11 How much autonomy do intrapreneurs have in your program?
12 Are intrapreneurs encourage to work in interdisciplinary teams? If so, how?
13 How are intrapreneurs incentivized in the program?
14 How are intrapreneurship projects monitored in your organization?
15 How is the success of the program measured?
Appendix A
Questionnaire outline for intrapreneurship program managers
 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8. Appendix C: Valorization-addendum 
 
Dynamical changing market conditions require organizations to continuously adapt. This does 
not merely affect a firm’s market-facing product line, but rather its organizational versatility to 
adjust to any given market environment as quickly as possible. While over the past decades, 
the ascent of multinational firms has been primarily attributed to the ability to deliver a 
particular product or service range at consistent quality for a competitive price; today’s growth 
leaders are information-driven powerhouses that compete on innovativeness and speed. Hence, 
too big to fail is outdated; too quick to fail is the new paradigm.  
In light of this paradigm shift, the studies in my dissertation analyze two crucial components 
that allow organizations to persist under dynamic market circumstances. First, I analyze capital 
budgeting decision for innovation projects in face of risk and information abundance and how 
that alters decision-making behavior. Second, I delineate the role of top management in 
facilitating intrapreneurial undertakings as a means to innovate in an established organization. 
Nowadays, decision-makers face an overabundance of information. Navigating through large 
amounts of information to determine what information is diagnostic for a decision outcome, 
and what is not, is not only effortful, but can also bear the risk that decision-makers consider 
nondiagnostic information in a decision task. In this dissertation I show that this deficiency 
exists in capital budgeting decisions for innovation projects and that decision-makers take 
nondiagnostic information into account when exposed to it. As a consequence, capital 
budgeting decision dilute, such that decision-makers allocate less funds to projects when taking 
nondiagnostic information into account, even more so with an increasing amount of 
nondiagnostic information available. To ensure that decision-makers allocate adequate funds to 
innovation projects, companies need to reevaluate the amount and breadth of information 
utilized in capital budgeting decision. Although a general tendency to include as much 
information as possible in order to take an informed decision, my results show that there are 
 
limits. More is not necessarily better, it is more important to provide selected and relevant 
information that decision-makers can process effectively in capital budgeting tasks. 
Further, my research suggests that decision-makers tend to exhibit a preference for familiar 
information cues when it comes to an overabundance of information causing cognitive load. 
This is particularly relevant for strategic decisions where different types of information, for 
instance financial and non-financial, are integral part of the decision-making process. An 
individual preference under difficult circumstances such as risk or cognitive load may cause 
suboptimal decisions, thereby endangering a company’s long-term success. Particularly for 
decisions of strategy or budget allocation where information load is high, firms are well-advised 
to ensure that decision-makers review all relevant information and not limit the sight on familiar 
cues. This can for example be achieved through an adequate management information system 
that directs decision-makers attention relevant information and does not permit to limit attention 
on familiar information cues. 
While effective capital budgeting decision-making under risk and cognitive load are crucial for 
the success of a company, so is the execution of funded innovation projects. One way of driving 
innovation projects is by facilitating intrapreneurial activity, so encouraging entrepreneurs in 
an existing organization to thrive. In my dissertation, I analyzed the role of top managers to 
increase the impact of intrapreneurship in an organization. As intrapreneurial activity is 
commonly a bottom-up initiative, it is extremely important that top managers create an 
environment that supports intrapreneurs as innovators rather than an alien to the core business. 
My research shows that top managers can support intrapreneurial projects through promoting 
and engaging the intrapreneur. It shows that these initiatives yield more successful results when 
top management support is provided in order to overcome obstacles in an established 
organization. This is particularly important when inertia has built up over time and any doubt 
about the ongoing core business is not permitted by anyone. Top managers need to safeguard 
 
these doubters and intrapreneurs in order to remain competitive in the long-run and tap into 
novel revenue streams. 
At the same time, however, top managers should not become too committed in an 
intrapreneurial project. Because what starts out as support may turn into interference with the 
actual intrapreneurs work such that the innovativeness of the undertakings is actually reduced. 
This can stem from a lack of understanding, which is especially severe in technology areas, 
where top managers’ technical expertise may not be comprehensive enough to grasp an 
intrapreneur’s business idea. Also, top managers’ short-sighted incentive schemes may also 
hamper with the innovativeness of intrapreneurship projects. While innovations usually take 
immense financial effort with payback in very distant future, top managers may urge 
intrapreneurs to not aim for a long shot, but rather focus on the near-term impact of the 
initiative. Hence, top managers should balance their support depending on the situation to 
ensure that the projects have a chance to be successful within the organization, while also 
making sure that time and resources are provided to permit the realization of long-term 
objectives. 
Lastly, it is important to create an environment for intrapreneurs to excel with their projects. 
My research shows that this is not limited to time and financial resources that need to be 
provided to intrapreneurs, but it is also about personal networks. From the interview and survey 
evidence, it can be inferred that especially in large organization a personal network is crucial 
for intrapreneurial undertakings to be successful. Given that not every intrapreneur has an intra-
organizational network, it is important that top managers act as catalyst to bring the right people 
together in order to make innovation happen, but also safeguarding a smooth execution of the 
intrapreneurship project. 
To sum up, the three studies of this dissertation examine capital budgeting decisions for 
innovation projects under risk and information overabundance as well as the top management 
 
role in the execution of innovative intrapreneurship projects. All studies have direct practical 
implications for top managers and corporate decision-makers. With my dissertation I contribute 
a better understanding of the behavior of decision-makers under challenging conditions, which 
allows organizations to mediate this behavior in order to prevent suboptimal decisions. Further, 
I provide insights in the role of top managers to allow intrapreneurs to successfully pursue 
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